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I. INTRODUCTION

In their introduction to a fine new edition of Alexis de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America, Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba
Winthrop claim that "[i]f the twentieth century has been an American
century, it is because the work of America... has been to keep
democracy strong where it is alive and to promote it where it is weak
or nonexistent."1 By "democracy" they doubtless intend something
akin to "constitutional democracy," 2 "liberal democracy,"3 or

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks to Alison Brown for research, to
the participants in the Georgetown/PEGS Discussion Group on Constitutional Law and my
colleagues at Vanderbilt University Law School, for forums to talk about the essay; and to
Rebecca Brown, Robert Covington, Allison Danner, Paul Edelman, James Ely, John Goldberg,
Chris Guthrie, Walter Murphy, Richard Nagareda, Suzanna Sherry, Robert Thompson, and
Christopher Yoo for helpful comments and conversations.
1.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA xvii (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds., 2000).
See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-53
2.
(2d ed. 1995).
3.
See WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 85, 162 (1993).

1815

1816

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1815

"republican government." 4 I take each of these to be a rough proxy for
a constitutionalist system that includes (1) institutions authorized by
and accountable to the people (both in the making of the order and in
the regular operation of government); (2) some notion of limited
government (whether by the designation of purposes for governmental
action, the specification of rights, or the allocation of authority among
institutions); and (3) rule of law (which connotes the regularization of
processes by which public norms are made and applied). Whatever
the precise contours of the concept, the claim that the success and
strength of the United States derive from a commitment to democracy
(or, as I shall use it here, constitutionalism), has an almost intuitive
appeal. It is my sense, however, that even a cursory look at the
United States' record of diplomatic, military, and covert initiativesthe regimes it has supported, opposed, or toppled, and how and why it
has done so-would raise doubts about that commitment.
In this essay, I give voice to those doubts. 5 I first observe that
much of the history of American prominence-even pre-eminence-in
the world is a story as much of military conflict as of
constitutionalism.
Second, I argue that the nation's persistent
engagement in military conflict is constitutionally significant. By
"significant" I have in mind two measures, although I do not attempt
to specify them precisely in this essay. One is that the persistent use
of force has altered consequentially the norms and institutions that
constitute the United States. The other is that, whatever their cause,
certain trends of American constitutional development have the
potential to do mischief and that this potential is exacerbated by
conditions of warfare, especially when those conditions are continual.
I identify five general areas of concern-five areas in which these
trends or consequences might be worrisome-from the standpoint of
constitutionalism: national ethos, rights, the operation of republican
government, the allocation of institutional authority, and the concept
of sovereignty. 6 I argue that the trends or consequences within these
domains are no less worrisome because the Supreme Court of the
United States has sometimes given anti-constitutionalist policies the
cover of law. Even if we assume that the nation has been consistently

4.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 111 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).

5.
For the most part, I confine myself here to overt military initiatives and do not take up
diplomacy or covert operations.
6.
One area I do not discuss is the relationship between armed conflict and federalism.
This omission is not because the impact of warfare on the vertical distribution of power is
unimportant or inconsequential; it is instead because, in a nation-state that assumes
comprehensive authority to maintain and regulate a standing army, incursions on federalism are
unavoidable.
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justified and effective in its uses of force, an irony follows: In
successfully maintaining a constitutional order, the nation may well
7
be weakening its constitutionalist roots.
II. HISTORY OF AMERICAN MILITARY CONFLICT
The United States is a regime founded on military conflict.
This is to say more than that the United States relied on a war of
secession to gain independence from Britain. It is to say that the
United States has resorted to military force frequently in its history.
In research conducted under the auspices of the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress, Ellen C. Collier has
catalogued "instances in which the United States has used its armed
forces abroad in situations of conflict or potential conflict or for other
than normal peacetime purposes" between 1798 and 1993.8
She
reports that the United States used its military on 234 occasions. 9
Employing more expansive criteria than Collier, Robert D. Kaplan has
recently brought her analysis up to date. 10 He enumerates 86 "U.S.
military operations" from 1993 to the present.1 1
Controlling for
overlapping citations, Collier and Kaplan cite a total of 318 actions
involving military forces of the United States from the founding of the
12
nation to the present.
For understanding the relation between military actions and
constitutional authority, Collier's list is underinclusive, and Collier's
and Kaplan's lists together are overinclusive. Collier's is
underinclusive for three reasons. First, it commences at 1798, which
excludes the American Revolution.1 3 My sense is that we should
include the war for independence. It was fought by a working political
system that had recently declared itself independent; and the period of
the Revolution was a critical juncture in the emergence of
constitutionalist norms and institutions. 14 Second, Collier confines
7.
In this essay, I draw periodically on present events. I do so not to denigrate
contemporary actors, but to show how events or actors are consistent with larger or more
enduring patterns.
8.
Ellen C. Collier, Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798-1993,
Congressional Research Service (Oct. 7, 1993), http://www.history.navy.millwars/ foabroad.htm.
9.
Id. An extended war, military action, or campaign counts as a single "instance" in
Collier's usage. Id.
10. Robert D. Kaplan, Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July-Aug. 2003, at 65, 75, 77, 79, 81.
11. Id.
12. See Collier, supra note 8; Kaplan, supra note 10, at 75, 77, 79, 81.
13. Collier, supra note 8.
14. Some might argue that "nationhood" did not commence until the last decade of the
eighteenth century, when the Constitution was ratified. There is a sense in which even this date
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her list to military actions conducted abroad. 15 This criterion, too,
excludes the Revolution. It excludes also the Civil War and most of
the military campaigns against the native tribes (carried out from the
earliest years of the colonial period through the end of the nineteenth
century). I suspect that Collier omits these last two because she
supposes they were prosecuted "within" the United States. There are
good reasons for challenging this supposition, 16 but I shall not press
them here. Instead, I claim only that-inside or outside-they were
significant military actions and have a bearing on the problem of
maintaining constitutionalist government. My own list, therefore,
includes the Revolution, the Civil War, and several campaigns against
There is a third way in which Collier's list is
native tribes.
underinclusive: It excludes covert military, quasi-military, and proxy
involvement in fighting civil wars or overthrowing rulers in other
countries. 17 Because these activities are difficult to identify, classify,
and track, I too omit them.
Collier's and Kaplan's lists are overinclusive because they
include all uses of military personnel on foreign soil in situations of
potential conflict. Kaplan's list, in fact, includes situations in which
the risk of conflict is remote.' 8 These criteria are too broad, for they
comprehend a number of engagements that were, for my purposes,
insignificant or inchoate.
I propose instead a list that includes only three types of
military action: declared wars; actions that, though undeclared, are
reasonably classifiable as wars; and significant military actions short
of war.' 9 With respect to the third group, "significance" is a function of
is too early, as the establishment of the American nation was a process that spanned more than
a century. I conclude, nonetheless, that we may mark the beginning of the United States with
the creation of rudimentary institutions of interstate cooperation and governance in the period of
the Revolution.
15. Collier, supra note 8.
16. For example, from the standpoint of the secessionists, the Civil War was fought almost
exclusively outside the United States. From the standpoint of the tribes, too, their conflicts with
the United States were predominately outside the U.S., both because the tribes frequently
claimed the locus of conflict as their own (though some may have been ceded by ostensible
treaties) and because, in any event, the lands were usually not yet incorporated formally into the
United States. Collier includes in her list only one campaign against native tribes-the First
Seminole War-perhaps because that conflict also involved campaigns against the Spanish in
Florida. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Kaplan, supra note 11, at 75, 77, 79, 81. Note, for example, the following operations
carried out during the first two years covered by Kaplan's survey: Provide Hope III (1993),
Balikatan (1993), Iris Gold (1993-present), Provide Hope IV (1994), Distant Runner (1994), Sea
Signal (1994-1996), Quiet Resolve/Support Hope (1994), Safe Haven/Safe Passage (1994-1995).
Id.
19. My list of military conflicts is attached as an appendix.
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one or more of the following factors: duration of engagement; level of
commitment of troops and/or other resources; form of engagement; and
strategic or historical importance of the conflict or location. In the
first group-declared wars-I include the Revolution, the War of 1812,
the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and
World War 11.20 In the second group-undeclared wars-I include the
Naval War with France, the First Barbary War, the Second Barbary
War, the Civil War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian
Gulf War, the Balkan intervention, the war in Afghanistan (and
beyond), and the war in Iraq. 21 All the rest-including campaigns
against native tribes and various invasions of Latin America-fall into
the third group.
Although my list of conflicts includes the Revolution, the Civil
War, and a few campaigns against native tribes, it is a more
conservative estimate than either Collier's or Kaplan's. As indicated
above, I exclude military actions that are insufficiently significant for
coverage here. For example, I have omitted dozens of limited actions
that aimed to protect American consulates, trade, insubstantial
interests, or small numbers of American citizens abroad. 22 Similarly, I
have excluded scores of actions that were essentially isolated
retaliations-by bombardment, looting, burning, killing, or simply
"show of force"-against foreigners abroad for insulting, assaulting, or
23
killing Americans.
I observe that from the Revolution to the present, armed forces
of the United States have participated in 84 distinct, significant
engagements. 24 Of these, 6 were declared wars, 10 were undeclared
wars, and the rest were significant actions (including campaigns
against Indians). In aggregate, these wars and actions have occurred
20. This description follows Collier in all respects, except that mine includes the Revolution.
Collier, supra note 8.
21. This group follows Collier's lead, except that it includes the Civil War and extends
beyond 1993 (and thus includes the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq). Id.
22. Note the following operations, just to cite a few examples: destruction of Nicholls Fort in
Spanish Florida (1816), invasion of Amelia Island (1817), operations in the Falkland Islands
(1831-1832), incursion in Argentina (1833), incursions in Peru (1835-36), incursion in China
(1843), demonstration and landing in Africa (1843), naval operation in Smyrna (1849), incursions
in Argentina (1852-1853), incursions in Nicaragua (1853), landings in China (1854), Operation
Distant Runner (Rwanda, 1994). Id.; Kaplan, supra note 10, at 75, 77, 79, 81.
23. A few examples, from the nineteenth century, would include actions in the following
locations: Sumatra (1832), Sumatra (1838-1839), Fiji Islands (1840), Drummond Island (1841),
Samoa (1841), Turkey (1851), Johanns Island (1851). Collier, supra note 8. One exception to
these exclusions is the American bombardment and burning of Greytown, Nicaragua, to punish
local officials for having offended an American diplomat in 1854. I include that event because it
became a model for this sort of military action in later years.
24. Despite my adding the Revolution, the Civil War, and 13 military engagements with
Indians, my list is but 26% of Collier's and Kaplan's combined 318 instances.
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in 182 of the 228 years covered by my analysis (80 percent of the life of
the nation). In the last quarter of the 18th century, there were 12
years in which the United States did not use its military according to
my classification (or 48 percent of that period); in the 1 9th century,
there were 28 such years (28 percent); in the 20th century, there were
but 6 such years (6 percent); and so far in the 21st century, there have
been no such years. In connection with these figures, the 20th century
is notable for two reasons. First, despite the frequency of military
conflict in that century, only two conflicts were formally declared as
wars: the two "world wars. '25 Second is the unbroken sequence of
significant military engagements since the end of World War 11.26
What follows, as an empirical matter, is this: The United
States has been at war or engaged in significant military action for
most of its corporate life. The rate of engagement has increased
dramatically from the eighteenth through the twenty-first centuries.
In fact, the country's military has been actively engaged every year
since 1941. This engagement has continued despite the demise of
Soviet Communism. The persistence of engagement shows no sign of
abating. 27 Simply, military action has been such a substantial part of
the history of the nation that it is not unfair to characterize the
United States as a warrior state.
I should be clear about my meaning here. The warrior state is
not necessarily a martial state. Hence, it need not connote a regime
that glorifies war or the military, nor one in which the military
controls the administration of state, nor one that comprehensively
organizes and regulates society for predominantly militarist purposes,
akin to Sparta in ancient Peloponnesus. In fact, it is one of the
distinctive aspects of the American experience that the nation's
military actions have tended neither to arise from nor to provoke a
crisis; that is, the nation has typically used military force under
conditions in which (1) the survival of the order is not at risk and (2)
the order can simultaneously fight and maintain a domestic life that
appears to be "normal."28 In using the term, therefore, I have in mind
25. It is tempting to note, in connection with this observation, that both declared wars were
waged in Europe. The fact, however, that in World War II the United States declared war first
against Japan and later against the European members of the Axis, complicates this observation.
26. A third twentieth-century tendency may follow from the first two: the steady
accumulation of military prerogative in the office of the President. I shall address this tendency
below.
27. As George W. Bush has noted, the present war against terrorism is not susceptible to
geographic or temporal limitation. George W. Bush, Remarks to Nation During a Press
Conference (Oct. 11, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/ 20011011-7.html.
28. Possible exceptions to one or both of these observations are the Revolutionary War, the
Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War.
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merely a regime for which the use of military force is a regular aspect
of the nation's life.
In labeling the United States as a warrior state, we need not
question in each instance the validity of the nation's motives or
reasons for action. Thus, we need not judge whether each of its
military actions has been defensive or offensive, justified or unjust.
Perhaps the world is more dangerous today (for the most powerful
nation in the history of the planet) than it was two-and-a-quarter
centuries ago (for a fledgling nation barely able to defend its borders).
Perhaps, more simply, the assumption of political realists is right:
Military might remains the path to influence in the world or, more
charitably, to maintaining conditions of relative freedom at home and
abroad. 29 Perhaps, for a significant number of actions, imperialist
30
ambition has been the primary motive for resorting to armed force.
Perhaps individual presidents and their administrations have
perceived an institutional advantage in prosecuting actions, and the
accumulation of policies of many administrations has gradually
become the policy of the regime. There might be other explanations.
My aim, however, is not to explain causes of this sort. It is instead to
reflect on the possible constitutional implications of a warrior state, no
matter how well intended it might be.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Neither war nor the military that wages it is inherently anticonstitutionalist. Alexander Hamilton, for example, offered a military
justification for ratifying the proposed Constitution of the United
States. He bemoaned "[t]he imbecility of our government" under the
Articles of Confederation. 3 1 "We may indeed.., have reached almost
the last stage of national humiliation." 32 Among the insufficiencies of
29. With respect to the latter motive see George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan.
28, 2003), (saying "Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of
all mankind.), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html. With respect
to the former, Thucydides put it this way: "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they must." THUCYDIDES, THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THUCYDIDES 331 (Richard Crawley
trans., 1951).
30. See generally WALTER LAFEBER, THE NEW EMPIRE: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
EXPANSION, 1860-1898 (1963); ERNEST R. MAY, IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY: THE EMERGENCE OF
AMERICA AS A GREAT POWER (1961); JAMES C. THOMSON, JR. ET AL., SENTIMENTAL IMPERIALISTS:

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN EAST ASIA (1981). For useful comparisons, focusing on the
avowedly imperialist ambition of Britain, see generally BYRONE FARWELL, QUEEN VICTORIA'S
LITTLE WARS (1972); NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD
ORDER AND THE LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER (2002).

31.
32.

THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
Id. at 29.
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the Confederacy, he said, was its inability to perform "engagements,"
to enforce agreements transferring territory to the United States, to
"repel aggression," to secure navigation of the Mississippi River, to
sustain "respectability in the eyes of foreign powers," or to "safeguard
against foreign encroachments." 33 Hamilton obsessed that the country
was facing "impending anarchy." 34 He offered three reasons for this
state of affairs: (1) a "want of concert" in commerce, war, and foreign
affairs, (2) the absence of "vigorous," "economical," and equitable
means to raise armies, and (3) the lack of a national judicial power,
focused in "one SUPREME TRIBUNAL" with the power to enforce the
nation's treaties as "the law of the land." 35 The solution, he argued,
was simple. The national government must be provided the power to
promote "the common defence of the members; the preservation of the
public peace...; the regulation of commerce with other nations...;
[and] the superintendence of intercourse, political and commercial,
with foreign countries."3 6 Defense was the lynchpin of all of these
functions. In fact, he insisted, the power of defense was illimitable:
"[N]o constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to
which the care of it is committed." 37 Hence war, or the power to wage
it, was a comprehensive, "unconfined authority" on which the success
and survival of the extended commercial republic depended. 38
But, as even Hamilton sometimes conceded, strength alone was
an insufficient justification for the Constitution. Put differently, if
war (or the military) can create or conserve conditions for making or
maintaining
constitutionalist
politics,
it
cannot
establish
constitutional authority. 39 The reason rests in the distinction between
power and authority. Hamilton comprehended something of this
distinction when he posited that the proposed Constitution was an
"experiment" in whether it was possible to "establish[ ] good
government from reflection and choice," instead of relying on "accident
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 29.
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 51, 55-56 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.

1981).

36.

THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 58-59 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.

1981).

37. Id.
38. Id. at 60-61. The physical safety of the order to one side, wars and military
engagements might have beneficial consequences, some of which are constitutionally significant:
social solidarity, incentives to expand civil rights or the fruits of membership in the order,
technological development, and economic energy. Chris Guthrie has pointed out in conversation
that war might also invigorate the political process-by inciting public discussion of issues of
state and of values-that can be healthy (when not suppressed).
39. MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURE 206-07 (1998).
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and force." 40 In a constitutionalist order, then, the exercise of power
41
must be authorized and justified. Power alone cannot justify itself.
Power must also be constrained, for it is not the tendency of power to
limit itself.
Clinton Rossiter pushed the point further. "[T]he complex
system of government of the democratic, constitutional state," he
wrote, "is essentially designed to function under normal, peaceful
conditions .... 'Democracy is a child of peace and cannot live apart
from its mother[.]'. . . 'War is a contradiction of all that democracy
implies. War is not and cannot be democratic."' 42 Rossiter had in mind
wars of crisis, like World War II or the Civil War. Such wars are
certainly relevant to the concerns of this essay. But it is part of my
thesis that lesser, garden-variety wars or military actions, too, can
generate strains, sometimes imperceptible, within a constitutionalist
government.
There is, therefore, an ineluctable and dangerous tension
between military force and constitutional government. This tension
makes for a vexing dilemma. How does one configure institutions so
as to render them simultaneously safe and effective as repositories of
power? In the case of the military, the difficulty is intensified because
the implements of force it employs can be titanic. Moreover, because
one of the military's reasons for being is the physical survival of the
order, the stakes of military action (or inaction) can sometimes be
high. Thus, although raising and deploying armed forces may be
indispensable for sustaining a secure environment for constitutionalist
politics, creating a safe place and constructing safe roles for military
institutions are among the most troublesome challenges of a
constitutionalist order.

40. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield, ed., 2d ed. 1981);
see also BRANDON, supra note 39, at 206-07.

41.

In this respect, among others, I deviate from both Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt.

See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183-88, 231, 233-34, 246, 266, 272 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,

Penguin Books 1968) (n.d.) (positing that authority-whether legal, moral, or political-derives
from power and that he is sovereign who possesses that power); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5-6, 13 (George Schwab trans.,

MIT Press 1985) (1922) (positing a self-justifying state). Both Hobbes's and Schmitt's positions
derive from an assumption-implicit in Hobbes, explicit in Schmitt-that sovereignty resides in
the state. For reasons I shall return to below, this assumption is erroneous from the standpoint
of constitutionalism. See infra Section II.E.
42. CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 5 (1948) (quoting WILLIAM E. RAPPARD, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

(1938) and Wiley Rutledge, Foreword: A Symposium on Constitutional Rights in Wartime, 29
IOWA L. REV. 379 (1944)). I shall consider below Rossiter's solution to the problem of converting
constitutional government into a government of war.
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Abraham Lincoln framed the tension profoundly: "Is there, in
all republics, this inherent, and fatal weakness? Must a government,
of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too
weak to maintain its own existence? 43 The context that incited
Lincoln's questions was a crisis-in his view a singular, hopefully
temporary juncture in the history of the United States. For a regime
that is more or less permanently at war, however, the constitutional
difficulties may be more subtle and pernicious than Lincoln imagined.
In short, continual military engagement can pose additional dangers
for a constitutional order because it can generate conditions that are
uncongenial to constitutionalism. In this essay, I consider five areas
in which such conditions might hold-national ethos, rights,
republican government, the allocation of institutional authority, and
sovereignty-and I suggest why a constitutionalist might worry that
the conditions are present in the American order.
A. National Ethos
Doubtless, the warrior state is inconsistent with the self-image
of most Americans and with the standard proclamations of most of
their public officials. Even in time of war, most politicians insist that
the history, purpose, and ethos of the nation are peaceful. 44 It is not
mysterious that Americans would want to see themselves as peaceful.
For one thing, the normative precepts of constitutionalism presuppose
a degree of peace-sufficient to sustain reflection and choice-in the
regular affairs of the order. If Americans aim to be constitutionalist,
therefore, it makes sense that they would see their motives as
peaceful. Still, how might one reconcile their aspiration with the
nation's discrepant behavior?

43.

Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session July 4, 1861, in 4 THE

COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 426 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).

44. Mr. Bush's statements after the attack of September 11 are exemplary: 'This nation is
peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger." George W. Bush, President's Remarks at National
Day of Prayer and Remembrance (Sept. 14, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010914-2.html [hereinafter Bush, National Day]. To similar effect are his comments
anticipating a possible invasion of Iraq: "This nation fights reluctantly, because we know the cost
and we dread the days of mourning that always come. We seek peace. We strive for peace....
[But] if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States
military-and we will prevail." Bush, supra note 29; see also George W. Bush, Remarks at Naval
Station Mayport, Jacksonville, Florida (Feb. 13, 2003) (stating that the administration's aim in
invading Iraq would be "to keep the peace"), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/
20030213-3.html.
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One way to do so is to construct the world in terms of "us" and
45
"them" or, somewhat differently, in terms of "friend" and "enemy."
In practice, there are many ways of dividing the world on these
terms-national, ideological, economic, religious, racial, and others.
Often the conflict is viewed as implicating competing ways of life. But
whatever the content of a particular classification, it can be useful, not
simply as a description of the world or of competing aspirations, but
also because it protects against the disabling or disorienting effects of
psychic dissonance. If we have acted in warlike ways, "others" have
been responsible. Those others have been-are-dangerous. They
have provoked us. They have threatened us. Or worst, they have
physically attacked us. If we respond militarily, our behavior is not
inconsistent with, but actually attempts to preserve the ethos of peace
46
that genuinely defines us.
The psychic incentives for this logic have contributed also to a
kind of moralism in American foreign policy. This disposition is not
confined to the kind of morality represented by the internationalist
diplomatic agendas of Presidents Wilson and Carter. Hence, it is not
coextensive with what Robert Osgood characterizes as a pure form of
"idealism" (whose psychological antonym is "egoism"). 47 The moralist
disposition I have in mind extends to a more primal (and conflictual)

45. Carl Schmitt posited that the friend-enemy distinction was the central, essential
characteristic of politics (and therefore of the state), arising from an inherent psychological need.
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 25-37, 45-53 (George Schwab trans., 1976). My
claim is weaker: Even if the friend-enemy distinction is not inherent in politics, statehood, or the
psychology of individuals, it is nonetheless pervasive and potent. Against one American trend,
Schmitt refrains from moralizing the distinction: "The political enemy need not be morally evil or
aesthetically ugly .... But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his
nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that
in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible." Id. at 27.
46. Hence, Mr. Bush announced the invasion of Afghanistan from the Treaty Room, a place
from which "American Presidents have worked for peace. We're a peaceful nation.... Yet....
[i]n
the face of today's new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten
it."
George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Oct. 7, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html. Again, preparing to invade Iraq, Mr. Bush remarked,
"[s]ometimes peace must be defended. A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace
at all. If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means-sparing, in every
way we can, the innocent." Bush, supra note 29.
47. "An ideal is a standard of conduct of a state of affairs worthy of achievement by virtue of
its universal moral value. The motive of national idealism is the disposition to concern oneself
with moral values that transcend the nation's selfish interests; it springs from selflessness and
love." ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD, IDEALS AND SELF-INTEREST IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS:
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4 (1953). "National egoism," on the
other hand, understands "national self-interest" in terms of "a state of affairs valued solely for its
benefit to the nation. The motive of national egoism ... is marked by the disposition to concern
oneself solely with the welfare of one's own nation; it is self-love transferred to the national
group." Id.
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moralism whose constituent elements are good and evil. 48 In the
American context, this form of moralism surely has cultural roots in
Puritanism, which posited the existence of a covenantal relationship
between political community and God. 49 For American Puritans, evil
was in them-in all of us-as fallen creatures. 50 Their struggle,
simultaneously humble and arrogant, was to make themselves worthy
of the beneficence that the Maker of the Universe had generously
51
bestowed on them, if not on others.
By the second half of the twentieth century, of course,
Americans were not saddled with such doubt about their worthiness.
We can see the lightened load in Jimmy Carter's repeated invocations
of the goodness and decency of the American people. It is not that the
concept of evil was unimportant to Mr. Carter, certainly not for the
individual who might be tempted to sin; but most of President Carter's
public moralism focused on the aspiration to goodness, without
attempting to balance with references to evil. 52 In the context of
foreign policy, then, Mr. Carter could unashamedly pronounce: "Itis a
new world that calls for a new American foreign policy-a policy based
on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical
vision."53 Part of President Reagan's rhetorical talent was his ability
to restore allusions to evil without calling into question the basic
goodness of America. Hence, he could insist that the United States
had realized the Puritan aspiration to "a shining city on a hill" and
54
could depict the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."
48. This form of moralism is "conflictual" in at least two senses, both of which I shall
discuss briefly below. First, it plays a role in the resolution of a psychic conflict that adopts one
strategy for friends, another for enemies. Second, it tends to justify conflict with enemies.
49.

See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA: THE STORY OF JOHN WINTHROP

69-70 (1958).
50. See id. at 18-19.
51. See id. at 69-83. This habit of mind is not confined to Christianity. Some such
orientation is one reason the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians-each side claiming an
exclusive divine entitlement to the same territory-has been so explosive and enduring.
Consider also the conflict between some Hindus and Muslims in the multi-faith secular state of
India.
52. For an early example of Mr. Carter's general moral orientation, see JIMMY CARTER,
WHY NOT THE BEST? 9-11, 154 (1975). For his approach to foreign affairs while in office, see
JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 141-51 (1982) [hereinafter CARTER,
MEMOIRS].

53. CARTER, MEMOIRS, supra note 52, at 141 (quoting Jimmy Carter, Address on Foreign
Affairs (May 22, 1977)).
54. The first occasion for invoking the phrase "evil empire" was a speech to the National
Association of Evangelicals on March 8, 1983. RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 568-71
(1990); see also ANDREW E. BUSCH, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM 196-97

(2001). President Reagan's depiction of the enemy as evil revived a trope that had been
conspicuous earlier in the twentieth century. Recall, for example, references to the Kaiser and to
the Japanese as evil, diabolical, or unstable. On the Japanese, see PAUL L. MURPHY, THE
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George W. Bush has retained the simple structure of Mr.
Reagan's moral rhetoric but adapted it to contemporary events. Gone
are references to evil empire. (The Soviet Union is no more, and
"empire" no longer carries quite the negative connotation it once did.)
Now the goodness of America can go without saying; Mr. Bush need
only invoke "our way of life." 55 The notion of evil, however, persists
and now serves several rhetorical functions. Mr. Bush speaks of "evil
56
acts," perpetrated by "evil-doers" or "evil folks," who "lurk out there."
They are abetted, moreover, by nation states that, by design or
The American burden,
happenstance, form an "axis of evil." 57
is good and just in our
that
all
and
freedom
"defend
is
to
therefore,
59
58
This is an ambitious
world" by "rid[ding] the world of evil."
undertaking; but in pursuing it, the nation can ensure the blessing of
covenant. 60 Even the Lord, after all,
God and preserve the American
61
wields a "terrible swift sword."
The restoration of allusions to evil is politically potent because
it reflects a particular psychological form: the patriotic personality.
Osgood describes the form in this way:
A citizen's dependence upon his nation assumes a distinct intimacy because he confers
upon the object of his allegiance the attributes of a person so closely identified with his
own personality that he virtually acquires a second self, in whose behalf he can feel

CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969, at 233 (Harper & Row, 1972); Mar Matsuda, Looking
to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT Formed the Movement 63, 67-68 (1995). For an example of popular depictions of
the Kaiser, see JOHN A. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 778

(2d ed. 1970). See also OSGOOD, supra note 47, at 83, 169. In significant respects, this trope was
dormant in Carter's administration. For a comparison of Mr. Reagan's rhetorical imagery with
Puritan jeremiads, see PAUL D. ERICKSON, REAGAN SPEAKS: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN MYTH
72-93 (1985).

55. See George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html [hereinafter Bush, Nation]; George W.
Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html [hereinafter Bush, Joint Session].
56. Bush, Nation, supra note 55; George W. Bush, Remarks by the President (Sept. 16,
2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html.
57. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/new/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 1.html.
58. Bush, Nation, supra note 55.
59. Bush, National Day, supra note 44.
60. "Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God
is not neutral between them.... In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may
He watch over the United States of America." Bush, Joint Session, supra note 55. "Beyond all
differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together and facing danger
together.... And many have discovered again that even in tragedy-especially in tragedy-God
is near." Bush, supra note 57. Note also the numerous and various invocations of the phrase
"God bless America." See, e.g., Bush, Nation, supra note 55; Bush, National Day, supra note 44.
61. Battle Hymn of the Republic, http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/bathymn.html (last visited
Aug. 30, 2003).
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friendly, hostile, generous, selfish, confident, afraid, proud, or humiliated almost as
poignantly as he would feel these emotions for himself in his relations with other
individuals. However, the conscience of this vicarious personality, unlike the private
conscience, is relieved by the sanction of patriotism, so that a citizen can manage with a
sense of complete moral consistency to combine lofty altruism toward his own nation
with extreme egoism toward other nations and thereby actively support a standard of
ethics in foreign relations which he would not dream of tolerating in his private
62
dealings.

In short, the patriotic personality conjoins the two elements of
Osgood's antinomy-idealism and egoism-without fully integrating
them. The friend-enemy distinction reinforces and stabilizes the
segregated elements of this personality.
The bifurcation of political personality is useful. It promotes
the cohesion and attachment necessary for sustaining a voluntary
political order committed to resolving conflict through reflection and
choice. At the same time, it can both justify an aggressive posture
toward others and diffuse the psychic dissonance of this posture (as
against the image of peacefulness) by rationalizing aggression as selfdefense. What, then, makes the personality and the ethos that
reflects it problematic from a constitutionalist standpoint? We need
not pause over the concern that the rationalization is hypocritical. If
the friend-enemy distinction is not universal, hypocrisy is. Nor is
there danger that the patriotic personality is irrational. On the
contrary, it is almost perfectly rational, even as it is segregated.
In fact, it is the very perfection of this segregated rationality
63
that poses danger, for it may create a too perfect enclosure,
converting attachment to patriainto an article of faith and rendering
the peaceful self-image essentially non-falsifiable. This combination
can effectively incapacitate the citizenry from judging possible
Those citizens who
deviations from the image of peacefulness.
presume to judge will risk being labeled "the enemy," or at least
complicit with the enemy. 64 What follows is that, even if the peaceful

62. OSGOOD, supra note 47, at 11.
63. For a potent description of a similar enclosure, see MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PARMENIDES
88-91 (Andr6 Schuwer & Richard Rojcewicz trans., 1992) (conceding "the frightfulness, the
horribleness, the atrociousness" of the people gathered as a polis-"neither city nor state but...
the abode of the essence of this humanity").
64. In the present administration, the Attorney General of the United States has sometimes
flirted with such characterizations. In testimony before a congressional committee, for example,
he asserted that critics of certain of the administration's policies in the war on terror "give
ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's friends. They encourage people of
good will to remain silent in the face of evil." DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While
Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
313 (2001) (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft); see also John Ashcroft, Remarks to the
International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference (Oct. 7, 2002) ("Our critics want to roll
back the enhancements we deployed during the last year .... But history instructs us that
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self-image be a desirable aspiration and even if it be an accurate
description of some (or most) events, the image will cease to be useful
for constitutionalist purposes, because it will lose the capacity to
constrain or direct action. In short, it will justify almost any behavior,
and no one will be the wiser.6 5 Ironically, therefore, although a form
of nationalism can be useful for creating and maintaining
constitutionalist institutions, a comprehensively nationalist ethos can
weaken the constitutionalist character of those institutions.
B. Rights
Conventional wisdom posits that, in time of war, rights tend to
give way to power. Rossiter, for example, argues that any state, even
a constitutional state, will resist its own physical destruction and will
66
do so by any means at its disposal, even anti-constitutionalist means.
Hence, in time of war, "[c]ivil liberties, free enterprise,
constitutionalism, [and] government by debate and compromise" give
way to needs of state.6 7 So framed, this is an empirical claim. I shall
argue that it is overstated. Still, there is enough evidence supporting
it that the status of rights-whether civil liberties, personal liberties,
or rights to property or of enterprise-in a nation at war might be
worrisome from the standpoint of constitutionalism. This worry aside
for now, one question is this: To the extent that the empirical claim is
accurate, what might justify it?
reticence and complacency are not defenses of freedom; they are a capitulation before freedom's
enemies."), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/lOO702chiefsofpolicemnl.htm. The Secretary
and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also weighed in. See Top
Ranked Officer Denounces Internal Dissent on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2003, at Al ("Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, the nation's highest-ranking military
officer, denounced critics of the campaign in Iraq today, declaring that complaints about the
handling of the war were misinformed, inaccurate and harmful to American forces in combat....
General Myers also reprimanded members of the news media for analyzing, criticizing and
reporting anonymous dissent on a secret war plan they had never seen ......
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/O2/international/worldspecia/O2CAPI.html.
65. For a fictional account of the phenomenology of the patriotic personality in a state of
continual war, see GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 33-34 (1977) ("Winston could not definitely
remember a time when his country had not been at war, but it was evident that there had been a
fairly long interval of peace during his childhood.... Since about that time, war had been
literally continuous, though strictly speaking it had not always been the same war.").
66. ROSSITER, supra note 42, at 5, 11-12.
67. Id. at 5. See generally RALPH BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY (1958); WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); David Cole, Enemy
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Margaret A. Garvin, Civil Liberties During War, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 691 (1999); James W. Ely, Jr., Property Rights and the Supreme Court in World War
II, 1 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 19 (1996); Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 975 (1968); Carl Brent Swisher, Civil Liberties in War Time, 55 POL. SC. Q. 321
(1940).
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From within American constitutional discourse, there are two
prominent ways of approaching the question. The first is to invoke the
ancient precept-Inter arma silent leges 6 -- as principle's pragmatic
concession to necessity. This is certainly the approach of Thomas
Jefferson's letter to J.B. Colvin: "A strict observance of the written
laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not
the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our
country when in danger, are of higher obligation." 69 Some version of
the precept seems to lie behind Abraham Lincoln's suspension of
provisions of the Constitution during the Civil War. 70 The precept also
underwrites the Supreme Court's ratification of Lincoln's seizure of
commercial ships despite the absence of a declaration of war7 1 and the
Court's strained strategy of institutional self-preservation in Texas v.
White. 2 And silent leges lurks beneath Justice Jackson's dissent in
Korematsu v. United States: "I would not lead people to rely on this
Court for a review that seems to me wholly delusive ....
If the people
ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible and
unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its
73
restraint."
At first glance, the precept of silent leges seems an extreme
solution to a constitutional problem, especially when we consider how

68. "In time of war the laws are silent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 811 (6th ed. 1990).
69. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in xii THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
70. See Abraham Lincoln, supra note 43, at 426-37. Lincoln famously posed the question in
this way: "[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces,
lest that one be violated?" Id. at 360.
71. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
72. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). White was an original action brought by the provisional
Reconstruction government of Texas to recover certain U.S. bonds (face value of $5 million) that
the Confederate State of Texas had conveyed to two entrepreneurs who had undertaken to
deliver supplies to Confederate troops in the waning days of the Civil War. Id. at 717-18. At the
time of the action, Texas was under military occupation, had an unelected government that was
under the direction of the military and Congressional Radicals, and enjoyed no representation in
Congress. Id. at 719. Was Texas a "state," for the purpose of establishing original jurisdiction?
The Supreme Court had two options. One was to hold that Texas was not a state, which would
mean that Texas could not establish a basis for original jurisdiction, which in turn would mean
the Court was without authority to order the return of the bonds. For the Court, this option was
safe in one respect, for it rested on the principle on which the Radicals justified Reconstruction,
but it was dangerous because the Radicals wanted their Governor in Texas to get the bonds. The
other option was to hold that Texas was a state, which would mean that the Court possessed
authority to order the return of the bonds. This option was safe in that it would award the
Radicals' government the bonds, but it was dangerous because it had to rest on a principle that
challenged the foundation for Radical Reconstruction. As a matter of logic, the Court could not
pursue both options, but institutional self-preservation suggested another course. The Court
affirmed the policy of Radical Reconstruction and awarded the bonds to Texas. Id. at 729-32, 736.
73. 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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frequently the United States finds itself at war. Perhaps, for example,
it presumes too quickly that war generically threatens the survival of
the order. Some wars might-the Revolution, Civil War, and World
War II, maybe-but most seem not to do so. Perhaps, too, the precept
underestimates the capacity of judges to distinguish and stand against
unnecessary restrictions on liberty in times of military mobilization.
Does not the precept, moreover, make judges complicitous in extraconstitutional actions, requiring them to look the other way (or give
legal cover) when political or military actors claim necessity?
If these be vices, the precept might nonetheless have its
virtues. For one, it concedes without dissembling the brutish hold
that survival has on even a constitutionalist order. For another, it
sensibly acknowledges that judges are not competent to domesticate
all problems, that even law properly has its limits. And it might keep
off the books a principle of decision that "lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need." 74 These virtues aside, there might
be ways to tame the precept while conceding its dangerousness.
Following Rossiter's lead, 75 perhaps we could construct conditions for
the safe use of the precept. For example: (1) The suspension of
ordinary norms and processes would be permissible only in conditions
of genuine crisis, threatening the survival of the order; (2) the
suspension may be invoked only in an express and formal manner, by
an authoritative body other than the agent wielding extraconstitutional power; 76 (3) the suspension should be confined to those
means that are strictly necessary to addressing the present crisis; and
(4) the suspension must be expressly temporary, limited to the
duration of the crisis, revocable at any time by the authorizing body,
and revocable only by the authorizing body but never by the delegate
of extra-constitutional power.
It is possible, however, that even these conditions will not
effectively confine the danger the precept poses. Who judges, for
example, whether the crisis be genuine or sufficiently severe; whether
the requisite formalities of authorization were complied with; what
74. Id. at 246.
75. ROSSITER, supra note 42, at 297-306. John Finn has a more radical approach. He
concedes the inevitability of states' exceeding ordinary constitutional powers in times of crisis.
JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 40-43

(1991). One of his solutions is to require of nations that do so to "reconstitute" themselves after
the crisis has passed-in short, to ratify a new constitution to govern future normal times. Id.
76. The quaintly formalist assumption here is that the authorizing body will be one
representing, as fully as possible, the range of persons and interests embodied in the citizenry;
that is, the authorizing body will be the Congress. The agent, on the other hand, will typically be
the Executive, or some subdivision of the executive branch.
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means are strictly necessary; when the crisis has passed; or what to do
if a delegate refuses to yield to a revocation of or restriction on
authority?
Certainly courts are not required for all such
determinations at all times; but they are well suited to make some
such determinations in many circumstances. Which ones, if any?
Why (not)? And, if judges have their roles here, can they (or law)
avoid complicity in the retreat of constitutional norms or processes,
even if we assume that judges are up to the tasks assigned? Does not
a robust version of rule of law, moreover, require that judges
adjudicate, on the merits, under the Constitution, in good times and in
bad, as long as "the courts are open, and in the proper and
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction"?77 Finally, what follows if
Congress proves unwilling or unable to perform its roles?
Perhaps some or all of these considerations, especially an
increasingly muscular conception of rule of law (and therefore of the
scope of judicial business), have led the Court to opt for an alternative
approach to the status and operation of rights in time of military
conflict. 78
This second approach might derive from a certain
conception of rights. Specifically, we might invoke a more modern
precept, instantiated repeatedly in twentieth-century decisions of
courts in the United States, that the scope or content of a right
depends on the weight of the governmental interest asserted for a
policy that potentially restricts or diminishes the right. In short,
interests of state are balanced against those of individuals, groups, or
(sometimes) the collective body of citizens. 79 This balancing approach
is distinguishable from silent leges in its willingness to adjudicate
explicitly the "legality" of governmental policy.80 Outside the context
of war, Justice Black decried the "accordion-like qualities" of the

77. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
78. Ronald Dworkin may be the most prominent and unapologetic apologist for an
imperialist view of law. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). The Court, too, seems
enamored of such a view, but it has resisted Dworkin's libertarian conception of rights as
trumps. For recent examples of judicial supremacy, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
79. In a book that, inter alia, defends the legality of the internment of Japanese aliens in
World War II, Chief Justice Rehnquist conflates the doctrine of silent leges with that of
balancing. See REHNQUIST, supra note 67, at 218-24. For reasons suggested here, I think this
conflation is problematic.
80. It is possible, of course, that balancing is simply a disguise for the silent leges. I
suspect, however, this conclusion is too quick. For one thing, as I noted above, it discounts the
repeated analytic practices of courts across much of the twentieth century. For another, it
dismisses too quickly the possibility that what courts do is, at least in part, a function of what
they say.
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balancing approach to rights.8 1 Black's position, however, has plainly
lost the day in practice. Hence, military conflict or war, the analysis
goes, implicates weighty interests that might well justify the
truncation of rights. In Korematsu v. United States, even Justice
Black held that war was a special context for civil liberty:
[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. ... Compulsory
exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of
direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.
But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile
82
forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.

One of the virtues of this approach is that it comports with how
the Court treats rights in ordinary times. Because the analytic
methods are common, the Court projects an image of judicial
competence, dissipates the sense that the Court is "copping out," and
secures the apparent reach of rule of law. This virtue in turn has the
ancillary (or purposeful) benefits of promoting the authority of the
Court and, in relevant cases, supplying a legitimating stamp on
governmental action. It is also the case that the standards the Court
employs-rationality, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, clear and
present danger, and others-can provide a degree of flexibility and
subtlety in adjudicating competing interests. These permit the Court
to make fine judgments about the nature of the military conflict, the
severity of the danger to interests of state, and the character of the
claimed right.
It is precisely these virtues, however, that might make
balancing dangerous. We may put aside suspicion that the Court's
motives for using this approach are institutional aggrandizement and
self-preservation.
Such motives are persistently present when an
institution acts. More important than motives are the potential
effects of balancing. As Justice Black indicated in Korematsu, military
action on behalf of the nation will frequently look substantial and
83
exigent, as weighed against the parochial claims of mere individuals.
This appearance would seem to be all the more powerful when the
action involves war, especially a serious war resting on a plausible
claim of self-defense. It is conceivable, therefore, that balancing could
be subtly corrosive of rights precisely because it is so familiar. Gone is
the sense of judicial humility in the face of issues of defense and

81. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); see also
Barenblatt v. U.S. 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's
willingness to subject First Amendment rights to a "judicial balancing process").
82. 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
83. In a different context, Justice Black offered a version of this criticism. See Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-45 (Black, J., dissenting).
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foreign policy. Gone is the extraordinary character of silent leges,
particularly when invocation of the doctrine suggests an eventual
return to normalcy. When judges, through balancing, uphold a
governmental policy, they make it look ordinary. Ironically, this
might be more subversive of rights than outright suspension (as long
as suspension is followed by renormalization).
It would be a mistake, however, to make too much of these
worries, for American constitutional history presents another irony:
Apart from the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of black
men and eventually all women, the greatest expansion of civil and
political liberty in the United States occurred in the most recent half
century, a period that is an unbroken chain of wars and significant
military actions. This circumstance commends restraint in presuming
a general or unavoidable antagonism between war and liberty.
A recent study by Epstein, Segal, and King goes further. In a
quantitative analysis of decisions of the Supreme Court from the 1941
Term through the 1999 Term, the study asks whether the law is truly
silent in the time of war.8 4 It concludes, provocatively, "that the Court
behaves no differently in times of crisis than it does in periods of
tranquility."' 8 5 I believe that this conclusion, like the conventional
wisdom it assails, is overstated. There are three principal reasons for
my criticism. First, the authors' database, standing alone, is
inadequate,
for
the
analytic
dichotomy
(liberal
result=1;
conservative=O) on which it relies is too crude for the question being
considered.8 6 Second, in aggregating cases involving rights, liberty,
and justice, the study implicitly treats every decision as relevant to
the status of liberty and power in time of war. 7 Third, the study
defines crisis too restrictively.88 That is, it does not account for the
fact that during the period under investigation, there was no time that
84. Lee Epstein et al., During War Is Law "Silent"? An Investigation of Supreme Court
Decision Making in Times of Crises (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). To be
precise, the study investigates the impact of certain international "crises" on the Supreme
Court's decision. The authors specify three indicators of crisis: wars (World War II, the Korean
War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War); major international conflicts (the blockade of Berlin,
the Cuban Missile Crises, and the Iran Hostage Crisis); and "rally effects" (defined as an
international event that is followed by a surge of at least 10 points in the President's popularity).
Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id. at 8.
87. For a similar criticism, see Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu? Reflections on Civil
Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 276-78 (2003). Epstein, Segal, and King's study
partially addresses this criticism by analyzing two specific sets of cases--one involving aliens
and one involving conscientious objectors. Epstein et al., supra note 84, at 12-13. This is a
useful specification, but it does not save even this part of the analysis from the other criticism.
88. Epstein et al., supra note 84, at 1, 8-9.
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the United States was not either at war or engaged in a significant
military action.8 9 In short, it was a time of ceaseless warfare.
Consequently, the period lacks the variation required to establish
confidently the effect of the study's independent variables.
None of these criticisms aims to suggest that the study's
conclusions are baseless. The Court has not turned a blind eye toward
claimants of rights in time of war. 90 That fact is significant. It may be
that the rate and manner in which it has done so are partly a function
of "docket control." One way in which the Court can control its docket
is to render decisions-especially libertarian decisions-after
hostilities have subsided. 91 It may also be that the Court has rarely
enforced rights in cases that have required an expenditure of
substantial institutional capital. 92 Certainly, some of the Court's
failures to enforce rights have been spectacular. 93 But the aggregate
record is decidedly mixed, and the Court, for reasons both obvious and
subtle, has sometimes made more of rights than one might expect in
94
light of the conventional wisdom.
Nonetheless, it is worth asking questions about what the Court
has and has not done with respect to rights. 95 For example, even in
cases in which the Court has overturned a governmental policy, to
what extent has government already gotten what it wanted by the
time the Court has decided? Which intrusions into liberty are never
litigated, and what legal presumptions lie behind public or
institutional acquiescence in such policies? Which particular groupsnot simply aliens or conscientious objectors generically-are
disfavored in litigation? More specifically, which rights, and whose,
are (not) protected, under what circumstances, and why? In a variety
of contexts and times, property and enterprise have been subject to
heightened regulation during (and after) armed conflict. 96 Throughout
89. See infra Appendix.
90. Epstein's data support this weaker claim, even if they do not support the stronger claim
of "no difference." See generally Epstein et al., supra note 84.
91. For a general discussion of strategies for controlling the docket, see H.W. PERRY, JR.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).

92.

Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323, U.S. 214 (1944) (decided during World War

I), with Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (decided after cessation of hostilities).
93. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
94. See generally Epstein et al., supra note 84.
95. It is beyond the aim of this essay to address comprehensively or systematically these (or
other) questions about rights. Epstein, Segal, and King are to be commended for having
commenced such an effort.
96. See generally Ely, supra note 67. For one example of a policy that was justified under
the "war powers" but continued after the cessation of hostilities in World War II, see Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948). For other examples related to policies enacted during
that war, see LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 68-69 (1995).
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the twentieth century, socialists, anarchists, and communists often
suffered fines and imprisonment for exercising political rights of
expression or association. 97 During World War II, persons of Japanese
ancestry suffered deprivations of liberty and property, not for doing or
saying anything, but for being "members" of a feared group. 98
Throughout American history, aliens of various stripes have been
subject to procedural efficiencies and substantive limitations that
most citizens have not. 99 In time of war, these efficiencies or
limitations have extended to Quakers and other pacifists. 100 To return
to the earlier discussion of national ethos, each of these examples
(except for the regulation of property or enterprise) has appeared at
the nexus of two notions: a concern for national security and a
conception of who "we" includes (or more weakly, who is perceived to
pose a threat and who is presumed to be trustworthy).
Even stories of success, from the standpoint of rights, are not
fully exempt from the gravitational force of national security. W.E.B.
DuBois argued, for example, that Brown v. Board of Education0 1
"would have been [im]possible without the world pressure of
communism....
It was simply impossible for the United States to
97. See, e.g., Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2nd
Cir. 1917). But see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 301 (1965); Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290 (1961). Some of these prosecutions were not directly related to military conflicts. All of the
prosecutions after World War II, however, were connected to the Cold War.
98. See generally Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214; Hirabayashi,320 U.S. 81.
99. Constraints on and exclusions of aliens commenced early in the nation's history. See
Amendments to the Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570
(1798); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). The
Japanese internment, of course, included both citizens and aliens. For a critique of recent policy
toward certain aliens, see Cole, supra note 67.
100. See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 33, 58 (1997); A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN
PUBLIC LIFE 40 (1985); Perry Miller, PuritanState and PuritanSociety, in CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 25, 27-28, (John F. Wilson ed.,1965); see also Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437, 452, 463 (1971) (refusing to extend status of conscientious objector to persons opposing
only "unjust war[s]").
For decisions denying citizenship to aliens who were conscientious
objectors, see generally United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Bland,
283 U.S. 636 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). But see Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (striking down a state's policy barring unemployment
compensation to an employee who conscientiously refused to manufacture weapons); Girouard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (reversing exclusion from citizenship on the basis of
conscientious objection).
101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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continue to lead a 'Free World' with race segregation kept legal over a
third of its territory." 10 2 Lucas Powe notes that the United States'
brief amicus curiae in Brown explicitly invoked the relation between
civil rights for blacks at home and the struggle against communism
abroad.103 If this invocation were not decisive, Powe writes, it "could
10 4
not fail to impress Cold Warrior patriots sitting on the Court."
Brown aside, however, it does seem that concern for national
security has contributed to the diminution of rights, not simply for
Certainly, it has inured
identifiable groups but for everyone.
Americans to certain intrusions on person or liberty-for example,
searches or surveillance in courthouses, airports, places of commerce,
or other public areas-that would have been unthinkable a generation
ago. Many of these intrusions are never litigated; or, if they are, they
do not make it onto the Supreme Court's docket. These circumstances,
I suspect, are partly attributable to the low-tension force of law or of
perceptions of law.
The present war against terrorism and the invasion of Iraq
have intensified the trend toward the truncation of liberty generally or
of certain rights. Examples include the detention of persons in
military prisons without access to the judiciary,10 5 the indefinite
detention of American citizens, 10 6 the denial of procedural safeguards
to certain citizens,1 0 7 the closure of immigration hearings from public
102. W.E.B. DuBois, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DUBOIS 333 (1968). Derrick Bell has
adopted this position and converted it into a predictive theory, arguing that civil rights for blacks
tend to be enforced only when consistent with the interests of whites. See generally DERRICK
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 41-42 (1987); Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV.
518 (1980). More recently, Mary L. Dudziak has pressed a claim similar to DuBois's. See, e.g.,
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2000); Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the
Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641 (1997); Mary L. Dudziak, The Supreme
Court and Racial Equality During World War II, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35 (1996); Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregationas a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
103. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 35 (2002).
104. Id. at 34-36.
105. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules
of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677 (2002); Concerns over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS,
Jan. 31, 2003, at Al (noting that "[t]he European Parliament called on the United States to
immediately clarify the status of detainees at the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba"), 2003 WL 10856259.
106. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear a judicial challenge to confinement by aliens in military custody in
Guantanamo Bay); Timothy Egan, Terrorism Task Force Detains an American Without Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL 18100758; Citizen "Enemy Combatant" Gets Only
Limited Habeas Review of His Detention, 71 U.S. L. WK.1422 (2003), WL 71 USLW 1422.
107. Neil A. Lewis, Detention Upheld in Combatant Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at Al,
2003 WL 8364932.
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scrutiny, 10 8 and the secret inquisition, detention, or deportation of
hundreds of people who lacked discernible ties to terrorism. 10 9 One
recent, rapid response to the attack on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon was the USA PATRIOT Act.' 10 Although many of the
Act's implications are uncertain, provisions delegating to the
Executive broad powers to carry out surveillance against both citizens
and aliens have triggered suspicion among some commentators.'
The Attorney General of the United States has recently proposed
amendments to the Act that would expand executive powers,1 12 and
members of the majority party in Congress have proposed making the
Act permanent.1 1 3 Another, less rapid response was the Homeland
Security Act, which has centralized a large number of functions
related to security within a single national agency.11 4 A concern for
national security has also incited a movement toward the
militarization of domestic policing, including the use of military
personnel to patrol airports and a proposal to repeal the Posse
Comitatus Act. The latter proposal, if adopted, would permit the
armed forces to serve as a domestic police force, a power that has been
prohibited since the latter half of the 1 9 th century. 115 Again, it is not
108. Adam Liptak, A Court Backs Open Hearings on Deportation,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002,
at Al, 2002 WL 26112506.
109. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(denying release of information on persons detained after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks); Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Defends Detentions as Immigrants Recount Toll, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2003, at A23, 2003 WL 56605292; Christopher Newton, Judge: Gov't Can Withhold 9/11
Names, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, 2002 WL 25139850; Adam Liptak, After Sept. 11, a Legal
Battle on the Limits of Civil Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL 25399104. For a
comprehensive critical assessment of the detention and treatment of aliens, see OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (Apr. 2003), http://www.usdoj.govoig/special0306/full.pdf.
110. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
111. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 67, at 966-74. Recently, in response to questions from the
House Committee on the Judiciary, the Department of Justice reported hundreds of new
operations involving bugging and surveillance of targets, including libraries and mosques, using
"tools" provided by the USA PATRIOT Act. U.S. Dep't of Just., Report to the House Committee
on the Judiciary, May 13, 2003, at 38-40.
112. The proposal has been dubbed by some commentators "Patriot Act II." See Now with
Bill Moyers (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 7, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/now/transcriptI
transcript206jfull.html; Patriot Act Redux (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 21, 2003),
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/HallsOfJustice/hallsofjustice.html.
113. Eric Lichtblau, Republicans Want Terror Law Made Permanent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2003, at Bi, 2003 WL 18102654.
114. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
115. Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1878). Ironically, one motive for the Act, at the
time of enactment, was to prevent the United States Army from enforcing civil rights. See
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my purpose here to question whether any of these developments is
justified as a matter of policy. In fact, it is all the more poignant if
they are so justified, for they illustrate the tension between
order, on
maintaining the physical safety (if not the survival) of the 11
6
the one hand, and concerns of constitutionalism, on the other.
C. Operation of Republican Government
The third front on which the constitutional inquiry is
11 7
important relates to the daily operation of republican government.
James Madison claimed famously that the basic logic of the incipient
American order was republican. That is, its aim was self-government,
its structure one in which government "derives all its powers directly
or indirectly from the great body of the people.'118 Part of the purpose
for such a system is not only that the people are entitled to rule
themselves (according to notions of ancient liberty), but also that they
exert a low-tension force that directs and constrains the personnel
who populate formal institutions of government (promoting a kind of
DONALD J. CURRIER, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT: A HARMLESS
RELIC FOR THE POST-RECONSTRUCTION ERA OR A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO TRANSFORMATION? 3-6

(2003) (noting the use of troops to prevent violations of civil rights during Reconstruction),
http://carlisle.www.army.mil/ ssi/pubs/2003/posse/posse.pdf; see also Note, The Posse Comitatus
Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 953, 960-61 (1997) (observing that the
military was used to reinforce Reconstruction governments in the states of the former
Confederacy and was used to police the polls during the election of 1876). For the Bush
administration's proposal to repeal the Act, a proposal that is not motivated by a concern to
protect civil liberties, see Eric Schmitt, Military Role in U.S. Gains Favor, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2002, at A16; Margaret Graham Tebo, Posse Comitatus Under Review, A.B.A J. EREPORT (Aug. 9,
2002), WL 1 No. 30 ABAJEREP4.
116. If Clinton Rossiter's assessment and prediction are correct, there is even more reason
for concern:
There can no longer be any question that the constitutional democracies ... are
caught up in a pronounced, if lamentable trend toward more arbitrary, more powerful
and more 'efficient' government. The instruments of government depicted here as
temporary 'crisis' arrangements have in some countries, and may eventually in all
countries, become lasting peacetime institutions.... Each twentieth century crisis
leaves the governments of the United States, England, and France, and the valiant
small democracies as well, a little less democratic than before, at least by traditional
standards.
ROSSITER, supra note 42, at 313. For a similar claim, focusing on the role of crisis in expanding
both the size of the Unites States' government and its power over the economy, see ROBERT
HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

17-18, 61 (1987).
117. I take republican government to be the American version of self-government, which
Mansfield and Winthrop invoke as democracy. See generally DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at iii
(foreword by Mansfield & Winthrop). See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); cf. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 240 n.78 (2001).

118. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 233 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
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modern liberty). 119 There are many ways of contriving a system of
self-government; but however contrived, military conflict can strain it.
I do not refer here to the strain that a shortage of material goods can
impose, especially in the context of "total" war, though there is no
denying such a shortage can have important political consequences.
What I have in mind are a few related matters that may impede the
proper operation of republican government.
First is the level of secrecy required for both tactics and
strategy in the prosecution of military actions. 120 Plainly, some sorts
of secrecy are justified in this context. At the same time, secrecy poses
several problems for republican government. One is that it restricts
the flow of information-certainly to the public, but sometimes even to
governmental officials-that might be useful for framing public policy
(including the desirability of pursuing particular military actions). 121
Another is that secrecy bleeds. That is, it expands beyond the realm
that is necessary for sustaining successful military operations. 122 Still
another is that, in a regime in which military secrecy proliferates,
civilian control of the military succeeds only to the extent that civilian
personnel are conscientious and trustworthy. James Madison
119. For one iteration of the distinction between ancient and modern liberty, see generally
CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (rev. ed. 1947).
120. Secrecy can be promoted by silence, by management of information, or by deliberate
obfuscation. The aim of each is the same: concealing information. An artful example of
obfuscation is this excerpt from a recent press conference of the Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld:
The message is that there are no "knowns." There are things we know that we know.
There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we
don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know
we don't know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information
together, and we then say well, that's basically what we see as the situation, that is
really only the known knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we discover
a few more of those unknown unknowns ....
There's another way to phrase that and
that is that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
Lewis H. Lapham, Power Point, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 2002, at 305.
121. In the American context, problems of this sort were present in the War in Vietnam. See,
e.g., JOHN DEAN, BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS (1976) (on the connection between
the scandal over the Watergate burglary and the War in Vietnam); DORIS KEARNS, LYNDON
JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 280-82 (1976) (noting the role of the suppression of
evidence in order to maintain the War in Vietnam); MERLE MILLER, LYNDON: AN ORAL
BIOGRAPHY 386 (1980) (noting that President Johnson extracted the resolution committing
troops to Vietnam by suppressing evidence that the alleged military engagement in the Gulf of
Tonkin did not happen); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 329-30, 34142 (1973, 1974) (noting the pervasiveness of secrecy during the years of the War in Vietnam);
BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS (1976) (on the connection between the
scandal over the Watergate burglary and the War in Vietnam). But see LESLIE H. GELB &
RICHARD K. BETTS, THE IRONY OF VIETNAM: THE SYSTEM WORKED 2 (1979) (arguing that, with
respect to Vietnam, "the domestic decisionmaking system .. worked as it usually does, in the
way that most constitutionalists and democratic pluralists believe it should work").
122. Here again, the War in Vietnam is an example.

2003]

WAR AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

1841

criticized the first condition: "Enlightened statesmen will not always
be at the helm." 123 Thomas Jefferson criticized the second: "[F]ree
government is founded in jealousy and not in confidence; it is jealousy
and not confidence which prescribes limited Constitutions, to bind
down those whom we are obliged to trust with power .... ,124
Jefferson assumed that the people could be relied upon to check
unscrupulous politicians. In practice, of course, there are many
reasons this assumption might not hold. One, as I have already
suggested, is that the people often lack sufficient information to serve
as a rational check, especially in time of war. 125 Another is that, even
if they know enough, people can sometimes be sufficiently inflamed
against an external enemy that they create internal enemies as well,
essentially devouring not only potential friends but even
126
themselves.
The final problem for republican government in time of
military conflict is that civilian government sometimes effectively
delegates responsibility over plainly domestic matters to military
authorities. This was undoubtedly the case with the exclusion and
internment of persons of Japanese descent in World War 11,127 and
with the executive proclamation of martial law in Hawaii after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, a status that was maintained long after the
emergency precipitating the imposition had passed. 128 The Supreme
Court did not address the constitutionality of aspects of martial law in
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
124. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 178,
181 (Henry Steele Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 1988). Jefferson of course imagined that
states were proper instruments of popular control of national policy. Even so, his position in the
Kentucky resolutions seems to cut against much of his justification for the Louisiana Purchase.
See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin, supra note 69.
125. Note, for example, the unavailability of information that might have been relevant to
evaluating the justification for invading Iraq. James Risen, Iraq Arms Report Now the Subject of
a C.I.A. Review, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL 56604980; James Risen, Prewar
Views of Iraq Threat Are Under Review by C.I.A., N. Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL
55755072.
126. The populist and governmental excesses (democratic, legal, and bureaucratic) of the
Nazi regime are merely one extreme example of this latter tendency. For an account of the role
of courts in reinforcing that regime, see generally INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS
OF THE THIRD REICH (Deborah Lucas Schneider ed., 1991).
127. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). For discussion of the Court's deliberation in Hirabayashi,see MURPHY ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 89-101. Compare Justice Black's Opinion for the Court in Korematsu, 323 U.S.
214 (upholding military authority to exclude and detain) and MURPHY ET AL., supra note 2, at 8992 (noting Justice Black's similar position in deliberation in Hirabayashi), with Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 104-05 (1958) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that "the power to denationalize"
cannot be delegated to the military).
128. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 284-85
(1957); ROSSITER, supra note 42, at 284-85.
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Hawaii until after the war was over. 129 Even if government does not
formally delegate authority to the military, however, civilian
institutions can be susceptible to the influence of a militarist
130
orientation in the formulation or administration of public policy;
and it is conceivable that civilian institutions might sometimes act, for
purposes of both policy and administration, as extensions of the
military.
In his farewell address, President Eisenhower warned that the
danger was not simply from the military, but from "the conjunction of
1 31
an immense military establishment and a large arms industry."
The rise of this conjunction, he said, was a rational response to "a
hostile ideology, global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in
purpose, and insidious in method."132 Hence, "we can no longer risk
emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled
133
to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions."
Eisenhower insisted, however, that this very instrument for the
country's defense was itself a threat. "We must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by
the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise
134
of misplaced power exists and will persist."
D. Allocation of InstitutionalAuthority
The fourth way in which the military experience of the United
States bears upon the capacity to sustain a constitutionalist order is
that militarism can gradually alter working notions of institutional
authority in the American order. That is, military engagement can
alter the allocation of power or responsibility among institutions of
government. I am speaking specifically of accretion of power in the
Executive.

129. See generally Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (holding unconstitutional
the trials of Hawaiian civilians by military tribunals under martial law).
130. One comical illustration of the latter tendency was the televised image of George W.
Bush, bedecked in military aviator's gear, landing by fighter jet on an aircraft carrier just off the
coast of California. Editorial, A Long Way from Victory, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at A32,
2003 WL 55190147. A more serious version of the general phenomenon has been the gradual
militarization of American foreign policy. See, e.g, DANA PRIEST, THE MISSION: WAGING WAR AND
KEEPING PEACE WITH AMERICA'S MILITARY (2003).
131. GEOFFREY PERRET, EISENHOWER 599 (1999).
132. TOM WICKER, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 132 (2002).

133. Id.
134. Id. Perret reports that President Eisenhower had planned to call it the "militaryindustrial-congressional" complex, but at the last minute deleted the reference to Congress.
PERRET, supra note 131, at 599.
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The problem of institutional relations-the location and
limitation of powers to direct foreign affairs, regulate the military, and
wage war-is a murky area of constitutional law.
Part of the
murkiness is traceable to the text of the Constitution, which divides
particular powers between Congress and the Executive. 135 Technically,
the powers expressly delegated to one branch are distinct from those
expressly delegated to the other. Hence, the source of the difficulty is
not that the specific powers of the two branches overlap. The problem
is that the branches share, in a general sense, authority over the
military. And the sharing of authority can lead to conflicts between
the branches in circumstances that implicate the powers of each.
To flirt with tedium, we can tick off Congress's powers in these
areas. Article I vests "all legislative Powers" in the Congress. 136 More
particularly, it delegates to Congress authority to: (1) "provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"; (2)
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"; (3) "define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses
against the Law of Nations"; (4) "declare War, grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water"; (5) "raise and support Armies;" (6) "provide and maintain a
Navy"; (7) "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces"; (8) "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions";
(9) "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress"; and, of course, (10)
"make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
137
Execution the foregoing Powers."
Article I prohibits suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
"unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."' 3 1 Chief Justice Taney, sitting as Circuit Judge, was
correct that the location of this provision implied that the power to
suspend was vested in Congress; 139 Abraham Lincoln disagreed,

135. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II.
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
139. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (quoting Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) ("If at any time, the public safety should require
the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the
legislature to say so.") Taney noted further:
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however, 140 and his position prevailed, at least until the end of the
Civil War. 14 1 Article II confers authority on the Senate to consent to
(and give advice on) treaties made by the Executive and to advise on
and consent to the Executive's appointment of "Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls."142
Powers of the President are less numerous. Article II vests
"the executive Power ... in a President of the United States of
America."1 43 It designates the President "Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."' 44 As
mentioned above, the President has authority to make treaties and to
appoint "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (both,
again, subject to the "Advice and Consent of the Senate"). 45 And the
President is directed to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
146
executed."'
The constitutionally prescribed oaths of office for members of
Congress and for the President are similar but not identical. Article
147
VI obliges the former to affirm that they "support this Constitution."'
Article II obliges the Executive to affirm that "I ... will to the best of
my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
' 48
United States.'

But the documents before me show, that the military authority in this case has gone
far beyond the mere suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It has,
by force of arms, thrust aside the judicial authorities and officers to whom the
constitution has confided the power and duty of interpreting and administering the
laws, and substituted a military government in its place, to be administered and
executed by military officers ....
These great and fundamental laws [guaranteeing
due process of law, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and providing for
a speedy trial in a court of law], which congress itself could not suspend, have been
disregarded and suspended... by a military order, supported by force of arms. .... In
such a case, my duty was too plain to be mistaken. I have exercised all the power
which the constitution and laws confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by
a force too strong for me to overcome.
Id. at 152-53.
140. LINCOLN, supra note 43.
141. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Congress responded to the decision by
limiting the Court's jurisdiction in cases involving military trials or martial law. Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432, 433 (1867). For a definitive treatment of Lincoln and civil liberty
during the Civil War, see J. G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed.
1963).
142. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
143. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
145. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
146. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
147. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
148. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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Finally, without specifying an institution of the national
government, Article IV provides that "the United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." 149
Outside the context of war, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that contests implicating the Guarantee Clause were nonjusticiable
political questions. 150 With respect to reapportionment, later decisions
have not challenged the notion that the Guarantee Clause is not
subject to judicial enforcement. Litigants (and eventually the Court)
in the later cases simply abandoned the Guarantee Clause for a
different doctrinal peg: equal protection. 151 Where enforcing the
Guarantee Clause is concerned, however, the bottom line persists: The
1 52
Court concedes the field of play to other "political" institutions.
Although the record of the debates of the Constitutional
Convention is sketchy, there is reason to believe that this set of
delegations and obligations was motivated in part by a desire among
some framers to reject the British monarchical model of war and
foreign affairs in favor of a republican model. 53 Under the latter
model, primary responsibility for the commitment and regulation of
troops in combat was to belong to Congress.1 54 The reason rested not
merely on antipathy for this aspect of the British constitution, but also
on the assumption that Congress represented a wider range of people
and interests and possessed a greater capacity for deliberative
55
decision than the President.'

149. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

150. Luther v. Borden, involving which of two governments of the State of Rhode Island was
legitimate, was an early commitment to the position of nonjusticiability. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849). See also Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (deferring to the authority of the
President with respect to his decision "to call forth the militia"). Later decisions extended the
position to legislative reapportionment. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946):
Violation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be
challenged in the courts ....
The Constitution has left the performance of many duties
in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of executive and legislative
action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political
rights.
151. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
152. For a general analysis of the guarantee clause, see generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972).

153. FISHER, supra note 96, at 1-6.
154. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 45-

46, 448, 476 (W.W. Norton & Company 1987) (1966) (advocating a more limited role of the
executive in favor of vesting war powers in bodies less likely to be corrupted).
155. See FISHER, supra note 96, at 1-11.
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Practice and experience, however, soon rendered archaic this
vision of the centrality of a deliberative Congress. 156 Instead, they
vindicated at least one founder's alternative model: the way to
maintain and constrain a republican system is to "contriv[e] the
interior structure of the government, [so] that its several constituent
parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each
other in their proper places .... Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place." 157 The difficulty with this general
prescription for institutional conflict is that it begs for resolution in
particular cases. For one thing, it might be constitutionally desirable,
when possible, to resolve conflicts in a principled manner. For
another, it might be desirable, as a matter of pragmatic self-interest,
to have a device for circumscribing Madison's model of institutional
warfare in times of military conflict. 158 Enter the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Marshall insisted that "[t]he province of the court
is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals," and not to inquire into
"[q]uestions in their nature political."15 9 Despite this limitation, the
Court has sometimes found ways to insert itself into disputes over the
scope of institutional authority in time of military conflict.
As suggested above, the types of military conflict over which
legal or political disputes might arise tend to be threefold: (1) declared
wars; (2) undeclared wars; and (3) significant military actions. Each
of these types may include actual or threatened conflict.1 60 Similarly,
there are three general contexts in which parties might petition for
judicial intervention in cases involving military conflict: (1) the
direction and control of military actions (in the context of embargo,
invasion, or other intercession); (2) the direction and management of
foreign affairs; and (3) governmental action seizing property,
restricting enterprise, or restricting personal liberty (by exclusion or
confinement).
The institutional contexts in which cases might arise tend also
to be threefold (here I cannot improve upon Justice Jackson's
formulation in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer1 61 ): (1) the Executive might act pursuant to an express or
156. As a matter of constitutional drafting and interpretation, this development may
exemplify the power of parsimony and abstraction over detail and specificity.
157. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).

158. The reasoning here is simply that it might be more difficult to prosecute a military
campaign while institutions of government are at war with one another.
159. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
160. As noted above, however, the Appendix includes only actual conflicts.
161. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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implied delegation of authority by Congress; 62 (2) the Executive might
act in the face of congressional silence (whether a general silence or an
interstice of an express delegation); 163 and (3) the Executive might act
in the face of an express or implied congressional prohibition. 64 The
first of these contexts raises two questions: Was Congress's delegation
proper? If so, was the Executive's action within the scope of the
delegation? The second context raises an interpretive question: How
do we construe congressional silence? The third raises important
questions of prudence and principle: Should the Court intercede, and,
if so, by what standard should it adjudicate the dispute?
To put the point simply, the story of American constitutional
politics with respect to institutional relations in the context of military
conflict has been one of steady erosion of Congress's power to prevent,
confine, or even direct military action and of steady accretion of
executive discretion and control. The reasons for these trends are
complex. They include the President's direct authority to command
the military, the President's dominant role in foreign affairs, and the
increasing importance of the United States-politically, economically,
culturally, and militarily-throughout the world. They include also
Congress's general inability or unwillingness to check executive
prerogatives, whether by express prohibition or through control of the
purse. The sources of Congress's weakness range from the desire not
to look unpatriotic when the President commands the political stage,
to the fear of appearing less than supportive of American troops who
stand in harm's way, to the obvious disabilities that afflict institutions
that must coordinate collectively.
We may add to these considerations the fact that Congress's
primary power with respect to particular conflicts is merely to declare
war, not to wage it. Congress may terminate appropriations necessary
for waging war, but doing so is almost always politically untenable.
Moreover, although Congress has power to make rules for regulating
the armed forces, the more direct "street-level" control that flows from
the Executive's authority as commander-in-chief often supercedes

162. According to Jackson, this circumstance supports "the strongest of presumptions" in
favor of executive power. Id. at 635, 637.
163. According to Jackson, this circumstance is best described as a "zone of twilight in which
[President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain." Id. at 637. The "test of power," he wrote, "is likely to depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." Id.
164. Here, wrote Jackson, the President's authority is "at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter." Id. In this circumstance, courts should "scrutinize [the presidential claim] with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system." Id. at 637-38.
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general rules of regulation. 165 Another reason for executive superiority
is the difficulty Congress faces in enforcing rules against a President
who sees the world differently from Congress. Considerations of
policy, too, have historically reinforced executive prerogative free from
congressional control: "self defense" (entailing executive authority to
deploy troops to defend against aggression); "neutrality" (authority to
deploy troops in foreign venues to protect American citizens and
property, so long as the troops remain neutral among factions
competing in the venue); and "collective security" (authority to
intervene pursuant to international agreements or treaties to promote
the joint security of signatory nations). 166
Beyond these considerations is the historical deference paid to
the President in foreign affairs, which bear such a close kinship to
military action. 67 I shall say more about this below. It suffices for
now to observe that, although Congress's powers over war and foreign
affairs are numerous, the logic of the Constitution's allocation of
power and the historical deference the Executive has enjoyed in
foreign affairs tend to favor the President. They do so, that is, unless
Congress can rely on another institution to shore up its position.
At one time, it appeared the Court might be willing to support
Congress and hence to uphold the sometimes populist positions of
Madison and Jefferson against the centralist position of Alexander
Hamilton. 68 In Little v. Barreme, for example, Congress authorized
the Navy, during the Quasi-Naval War with France, to seize American
vessels bound to a French port. 16 9 The Secretary of the Navy went
further, ordering the seizure of such vessels bound to or from a French
port.1 70 The Navy's frigate Boston seized The Flying Fish, bound from
a French port, and filed a libel action against the vessel.' 7' The owner
of The Flying Fish challenged the seizure as illegal. 172
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall oddly tucked two
contradictory opinions into one. The first, and more extensively
reasoned, supported the Captain of the Boston. For one thing,
Marshall wrote, the President's constitutional powers are capacious. 73
165. But see RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP

FROM FDR TO CARTER 9-10 (1980) (claiming that presidential power is the power to persuade and
that successful persuasion is not guaranteed).
166. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 353-55 (6th ed. 2000).

167. Id. at 229-30.
168. Id. at 252-55.
169. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
170. Id. at 171-72, 178.

171. Id. at 176.
172. Id. at 176-78.
173. Id. at 177-78.
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For another, the President's "construction" of Congress's delegation
was actually "much better calculated to give it effect" than were the
plain words of the delegation. Hence, Marshall noted that
I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favor of the opinion.., that a
distinction ought to be taken between acts of civil and those of military officers; and
between proceeding within the body of the country and those on the high seas. That
implicit obedience which military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors...
appeared ... to imply the principle that those orders... ought to justify the person
74
whose general duty it is to obey them.1

But Marshall did not stop there. In an abrupt shift, he tersely
wrote, "I have been convinced that I was mistaken, and I have receded
from this first opinion. I acquiesce in that of my brethren... that the
instructions [of the Secretary] cannot change the nature of the
transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would
have been a plain trespass." 175
In short, the Executive lacked
independent authority to act beyond Congress's express delegation.
Despite this beginning, the Court has shied from insinuating
itself into inter-institutional disputes over control of military action.
As noted above, the operating logic of institutional power, in contrast
with the textual allocation of authority, has tended to favor the
Executive as against Congress. Even when the Court has stepped
in-because avoidance was difficult or because there were political
incentives or legal reasons to intercede-it has supported Executive
authority more often than not. This has frequently been true even
when interests of property or personal liberty-Marshall's "rights of
individuals"-were at stake.
Hence, in The Prize Cases, the Court affirmed the
condemnation of merchant vessels seized pursuant to President
Lincoln's order to blockade Confederate ports in 1861, although
Congress had not declared war.176 One doctrinal strategy might have
been to distinguish the case from The Flying Fish by claiming that in
the prior case Congress had directed a precise manner for employing
military force. Complete congressional silence, on this view, might
ironically imply greater executive discretion than would congressional
delegation. But the Court did not pursue this distinction, opting
instead to search for an express delegation. 77 It invoked two, both of
which were enacted to address specific circumstances long passed:
[B]y the Acts of Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, [the President]
is authorized to call out the militia and use the military and naval forces of the United

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 179.
Id.
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
Id. at 668.
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States in case of invasion by foreign nations, 17and
to suppress insurrection against the
8
government of a State or of the United States.

The Court buttressed this invocation with three additional
moves. One was to assert that the President always had authority to
resist "invasion of a foreign nation." 179 There were some problems
with this move.
It was not clear, on Lincoln's logic, that the
Confederate States were a foreign nation. Lincoln prosecuted the
Civil War under the theory that the South's secession was a nullity
and therefore that the Union was unbroken.1 80 The Court patched this
problem with the ipse dixit that "States organized in rebellion"
nonetheless fell within the principle.18 ' Moreover, the Confederacy
might have pointed out that it had not (yet) invaded territory outside
the seceded states. 8 2 The Court did not address this point. The
second move was to invoke Congress's attempt ex post facto to ratify
"all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President, & c., as if
they had been issued and done under the previous express authority
and direction of the Congress."'1 3 The Court concluded that the
prohibition against ex post facto laws applied only in the realm of
criminal law, and in any event that retroactive ratification in this
context cured any defects in the President's order. 8 4 This reasoning
was compatible with dicta in Calder v. Bull, 8 5 but it contradicted the
holding in Fletcher v. Peck,'8 6 where Chief Justice Marshall for the
Court overturned a legislative enactment that amounted to an ex post
87
facto taking of property.
The final move was to assert that the President had authority
jure belli (by right of war) to order a blockade of ports of seceding
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See BRANDON, supra note 39, at 177-79.
181. Id.
182. Presumably, firing on supply ships and the federal garrison at Fort Sumter did not
violate this logic, because, after secession, the island became part of the sovereign soil of South
Carolina.
183. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670.
184. Id. at 671.
185. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
186. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
187. The bulk of Marshall's opinion rested on the enforcement of contracts for the sale of
land, which were relied upon by innocent purchasers who gave value but had no notice of a
possible defect in title, id. at 129-35, but part of his reasoning invoked principles prohibiting ex
post facto legislation:
"This rescinding act would have the effect of an ex post facto law. It forfeits the estate
of Fletcher for a crime not committed by himself, but by those from whom he
purchased. This cannot be effected in the form of an ex post facto law, or bill of
attainder; why, then, is it allowable in the form of a law annulling the original grant?"
Id. at 138-39.
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states, "which neutrals are bound to regard."1 88 The difficulty with
this move was not merely that it threatened the notions of delegated
and reserved powers that were central parts of the logic of the
Constitution, but that it obliterated institutional devices for checking
the President's power. For the Court held that the question of
whether the President was acting within the proper scope of his
authority
is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions and
acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was
entrusted.... The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to
the Court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such
a measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case.18 9

Eight decades later, similar, though not identical, reasoning would
lead the Court to ratify the exclusion and internment of ethnic
Japanese in Hirabayashi'90 and Korematsu.19 1
In the Steel Seizure Case,192 however, the Court pulled back.
The United Steel Workers had called a strike that would shut down
much of the country's production of steel. 193 In a pre-emptive move to
preserve production generally and, more importantly, to continue
production of munitions for the war in Korea, President Truman
ordered the seizure of targeted mills and the continuation of
production under the Secretary of Commerce, who appointed the
presidents of affected firms to continue day-to-day management. 194
The President notified Congress and said he would comply with
congressional will in the matter. 195 Congress offered no formal
reply. 196
Although the Court struck down the President's order, its
members could not agree on why. Justice Black, writing for the Court,
held that the text of the Constitution committed this sort of regulation
to the legislature and that congressional silence in the Taft-Hartley
Act implicitly denied the President the power he now asserted.1 97
Retreating from his prior decision in Korematsu, he held that the
Constitution's allocation of institutional authority did not change in

188. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671.
189. Id. at 670.
190. See 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943).
191. See 320 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1944).
192. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
193. Id. at 582-83.
194. Id. at 583.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 585-89.
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time of war. "The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking
power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times." 198
Concurring, Justice Frankfurter insisted that "experience," not
text, was the proper source for constitutional value and that the
threshold issue was the scope of judicial power. 199 He was bolder even
than Black, however, in reading the Taft-Hartley Act. Frankfurter
examined the history of Congress's regulation of disputes between
labor and management, and inferred that Taft-Hartley barred the
President's action "in so many words." 20 0 It did not, but Frankfurter
rarely resisted the chance to tweak Black. Justice Clark concurred,
relying in part on a problematically expansive reading of Little v.
Barreme.201 Justices Douglas 20 2 and Burton, 20 3 too, each concurred
separately.
subtlest
revealed the
Justice
Jackson's
concurrence
understanding of the implications of the case and of the sources of
constitutional principle for resolving it. Neither text nor framers'
intent nor experience nor judicial precedent was adequate to the task,
he argued. 20 4 What the case called for instead was a conceptual
framework capable of explaining and justifying the contextually
contingent allocation of institutional power. 20 5 The relevant context in
20 6
Youngstown, as Jackson expressly understood, was military conflict.
I have already alluded to his tripartite scheme for resolving disputes
Agreeing with Black that
between Executive and Congress. 20 7
Truman's order was "incompatible with the ... implied will of
Congress," Jackson urged not that the order was ipso facto
unconstitutional, but that the Court should "scrutinize [it] with
caution" to determine whether it was unconstitutional. 20 8 Jackson
rejected all of the President's claims, whether from (1) Article I's
general delegation of "the executive Power," (2) its requirement that
the President "faithfully [execute]" the law, and (3) its designation of
the President as Commander in Chief, or from (4) "inherent powers"
20 9
derived from "the customs and claims of preceding administrations."
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 589 (citations omitted).
Id. at 593-96.
Id. at 597-604.
Id. at 660-67.
Id. at 629-34.
Id. at 655-60.
Id. at 634-35.
Id. at 635-39.
Id. at 642.
See supra text accompanying notes 161-164.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-40 (1952).
Id. at 640-53.
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I shall not pause over the first and second claims. 21 0 The third
and fourth claims, however, are directly relevant to the concerns of
this essay. Against the third claim, that the President possesses
implied "war powers" to do "anything, anywhere, that can be done
with an army or navy," Jackson responded in four ways. 21 1 First, the
21 2
Constitution delegated the power to declare war "only to Congress."
Second, although a state of war can exist (and presumably might
justify executive action) without formal declaration, an expansive
understanding of war powers did not follow from that fact. 21 3 The
reason was that such an understanding implied a basic alteration of
the Constitution's allocation of institutional authority.
[N]o doctrine.., would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President
whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and is often unknown, can
vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own
2 14
commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.

Third, "the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy [does not]
constitute him also Commander-in-Chief of the country. '21 5 Fourth,
whatever the President's authority to employ armed forces "against
the outside world for the security of our society," authority is absent
"when it is turned inward, not because of rebellion but because of a
lawful economic struggle between industry and labor .... No penance
would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding that a
President can escape control of executive powers by law through
'21 6
assuming his military role.
Against the fourth claim-inherent powers--Jackson dismissed
what he called its "unarticulated assumption": "that necessity knows
no law. '217 We might doubt the wisdom of vesting emergency powers
anywhere, he said, but "emergency powers are consistent with free
government only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the
210. Against the first claim, Jackson argued that the text and purpose of Article I made the
President's interpretation-that it was "a grant of all the executive powers of which the
Government is capable"-unacceptable. Id. at 640-41. Against the second claim, Jackson
insisted that the President's duty to faithfully execute the laws must be read in light of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process of law. Id. at 646. The combination of the two, he said,
ensures rule of law: "leave to live by no man's leave, underneath law." Id. at 646, 654. The
proper way to guarantee this principle is to respect the Constitution's delegation of authority,
under which the Executive "has no legislative power." Id. at 655. President Truman's order, said
Jackson, was "an exercise of authority without law." Id.
211. Id. at 642.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 642-46.
214. Id. at 642.
215. Id. at 643-44.
216. Id. at 645-46.

217. Id. at 646.
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Executive who exercises them."2 18
In our experience, the safest
repository is the legislature. Does such a location make national
government vulnerable to incompetence in dealing with emergencies?
Implicitly confining The Prize Cases to its narrowest ground, Jackson
said no: "Congress may and has granted extraordinary authorities
which lie dormant in normal times but may be called into play by the
Executive in war or upon proclamation of a national emergency." 21 9
Jackson's concurrence is the most substantial, forthright,
unapologetic, and well-reasoned commitment by a member of the
Court, much less the Court as a collective body, to side with Congress
against the accretion of executive power in the military context in the
twentieth century. Hence, it stands against a powerful array of
countervailing forces across a century or more. It is open to question,
however, how influential it has been in affecting the behavior of
national institutions. One reason for my skepticism grows out of a
point that Jackson himself observed: "We may say that power to
legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only
220
Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers."
Congress has been a less than vigorous defender of its own
authority. The War Powers Resolution 22 1 is not an exception to this
observation, for it reveals more about Congress's weakness than its
power.
This joint resolution issues detailed commands to the
President: (1) consult with Congress before the introduction of troops
into conditions of actual or potential hostility, (2) report to Congress
within 48 hours after an introduction of troops in the absence of a
declaration of war, (3) report regularly to Congress about the status of
troops introduced into actual or potential hostility, and (4) withdraw
troops within 60 days after any report is due, if certain conditions of
the Resolution are not met: formal action by Congress (a) declaring
war or (b) authorizing the President to use the armed forces. 222 (5)
Against the Prize Cases, the Resolution provides that authority to
introduce armed forces into conditions of hostility or potential hostility
"shall not be inferred ... from any provision of law" unless the
provision "specifically authorizes the introduction ...and states that
it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the

218. Id. at 652.
219. Id. at 652.
220. Id. at 654.
221. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000) (passed November 7, 1973, over presidential veto).

222. Id. §§ 1542, 1543(a), 1543(c), 1544(b). The President may extend the 60-day period to 90
days by certifying to Congress in writing that "unavoidable military necessity" requires
continued use of armed forces. Id. § 1544(b).
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meaning of this joint chapter."223 (6) The President must remove
forces from "hostilities outside . . .the United States" whenever the
224
Congress "directs by concurrent resolution."
Whatever the motivations of various members of Congress for
adopting the Resolution, its effect has been minimal. Certainly, it has
been ignored or flouted far more frequently than followed. Even when
Presidents have adhered to its technical requirements, they have
sometimes done so without conceding the existence of a constitutional
obligation. 225 In fact, some in the White House, including Presidents,
have posited that the Resolution is an unconstitutional intrusion on
226
the Executive's authority over the military and foreign affairs.
There are several reasons executive resistance has been possible.
First, the Resolution's very existence is an implicit concession to the
227
toothlessness of Congress's constitutional authority to declare war.
Second, Congress has consistently lacked the will to use its
institutional clout to enforce the Resolution. 228 Third, the Resolution's
language and logic virtually invite niggling legalism by the Executive.
Hence, Presidents have interpreted the Resolution as implicit
permission to engage in covert operations or to conduct military
operations that can be completed within the Resolution's 60-day
At least one President conducted covert foreign
limitation. 229
operations, despite specific express prohibitions by Congress. 230 The
principal effect of the Resolution has been simply to shift the political
risk that comes from the possible failure of an undeclared war from

223. Id. § 1547(a)(1).
224. Id. § 1544(c).
225. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 2, at 460 (providing a synopsis of the first two decades of
the Resolution); see also Alfred P. Rubin, War Powers and the Constitution, FOREIGN SERVICE J.,
Feb. 1991, at 20, 20-21 (observing the infrequency with which the War Powers Resolution has
been followed by the President or Congress).
226. See FISHER, supra note 96, at 131-61 (providing a detailed discussion of the impact of
the Resolution).
227. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush initially indicated that he would consult
with Congress, but refused to commit to seeking Congress's authorization for the invasion. Eric
Schmitt, Iraq is Defiant as G.O.P. Leader Opposes Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at A6. Mr.
Bush later obtained authorization from Congress. Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1541).

228. The record of relations between President and Congress under the War Powers
Resolution bespeaks a lack of congressional will. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 2; FISHER, supra
note 96, at 131-61.
229. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 39-40 (1990).

230. The President was Reagan. Id. at 45-49. The prohibitions were contained in the Boland
Amendments, which were riders to annual appropriations from 1982 to 1986. Id. at 52.
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Congress to the President.2 3 1
Perhaps such a shift was the
predominant motivation of many members from the beginning. If so,
it merely underscores the chronic weakness of Congress in this area.
To summarize, there have been two lines of decision from the
Supreme Court.
One, exemplified by The Flying Fish and
Youngstown, posits a role for the Court to enforce limits on executive
discretion. The other, proceeding from The Prize Cases through
Hirabayashi and Korematsu and beyond, sharply curtails that role
and perhaps abrogates it entirely. With respect to the latter line, it is
tempting to read The Prize Cases as sui generis, confined to the
extraordinary circumstance that produced it. Commentary, moreover,
insists that the exclusion and internment cases are no longer good
law. 232 I am dubious of attempts to pronounce the demise of the
second line, not least because there is reason to believe that the
present administration adheres to it as a matter of both policy and
233
constitutional principle.
E. Sovereignty
The fifth area in which we might point to troubling trends in
the American order concerns not institutional relations directly
(although it implicates them) but the authority of the order itself. Let
me frame this as a proposition: The persistent American reliance on
war and military action has affected the regime's view of its own
authority. Specifically, it has weakened a constitutionalist conception
of authority and strengthened a statist conception that is ultimately
antagonistic to constitutionalism.
The sovereignty of the people is at the heart of American
constitutionalism.
Some scholars contest this claim, 234 but it is
231. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND

ITS AFTERMATH 54 (1993). The joint resolution that was taken as authorization to invade Iraq is
exemplary. Despite language tying congressional authorization to resolutions of the Security
Council of the United Nations, the joint resolution authorized Mr. Bush to "defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." Authorization for the
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 § 3(a)(1). This sort of language acts to give
cover to members of Congress who supported the joint resolution: Mr Bush was authorized to act
to defend militarily the national security against Iraq. This authorized action that a plurality of
Americans came to support and that Mr. Bush was probably inclined to pursue in any event. On
the other hand, if it later were to turn out that the nation's security was not truly at risk and the
electorate became exercised over the issue, members could insist that they were duped.
232. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 166, at 255 n.5.

233. See discussion supra Section III.B.
234. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).

See also MURPHY

ET AL., supra note 2, at 45-47 (arguing that the authority of the Consitution is grounded in
"political morality"). For an Hegelian account of American constitutional development that is
skeptical of the possibility of self-government on current models in American theory, see
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sufficiently well established that I offer it here as a fact. The reason
for the place of popular sovereignty is partly an accident of history and
partly a function of the logic of constitutionalism. 235 The historical
accident famously grew out of the fact that the English conception of
authority was grounded in sovereignty. When part of British North
America separated from Britain, declared itself the United States, and
eventually constructed new political institutions, it retained the
concept of sovereignty but jettisoned the English conception. In
crafting a replacement, the Americans drew on their extensive and
long-standing
experience
with
self-government-even
selfconstitution.
This accident of history is relevant to the logic of
constitutionalism.
I have argued elsewhere that all political
regimes-even constitutionalist regimes-"arise to some degree from
illegality. '' 236 Illegality is one way we recognize a regime as distinct
from its predecessors or its successors. The Constitution of the United
States, for example, was illegal from the standpoint of both the
Articles of Confederation and the specific instructions that Congress
gave the Constitutional Convention. 237 This sort of illegality invites a
basic question: When a new constitution appears on the scene, and a
new regime lays claim to it, why should anyone pay it any mind, much
less obey? This question of authority is important, because if the
regime aims to be constitutionalist, the founding cannot be simply a
brute fact. It must be justified. Here is how. The new order will try
to explain itself (because this, among other things, is what a
constitutionalist order must do). Typically, it will do so by reference to
the manner in which it came to exist. Hence the constitutionalist
preoccupation with origins. The story of the founding becomes the
device for self-justification, and it becomes part of the logic of the new
2 38
regime.

generally PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992).

HISTORY:

SELF-GOVERNMENT

IN

AMERICAN

235. See generally WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Rita Kimber
& Robert Kimber trans., 2001); HARRIS, supra note 3, at 201-04; WAYNE D. MOORE,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1996); EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING
THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Frank Michelman, Law's

Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
236. BRANDON, supra note 39, at 188.
237. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 49-53 (1998); BRANDON,

supra note 39, at 188-89, 204-05.
238. BRANDON, supra note 39, at 186-89.
ACKERMAN, supra note 237, at 49-53.

On the illegality of the American founding, see
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In the United States, the self-told story has typically been one
of popular creation. In truth, there have been many versions of this
story, but two general approaches have been notable.
One is
antifederalist. Prominent early proponents were Madison (at times),
Jefferson, and later John C. Calhoun. Framed simply, the
antifederalist approach posits that the Constitution, and hence the
order that traces its authority to the Constitution, was authorized by
the people of antecedent states. The position suggests certain ways of
reading the Constitution-especially ways of understanding the
allocation (and reservation) of institutional authority. Typically, this
understanding has entailed a more pluralist and/or localist conception
of norms and institutional authority. 239 Chief Justice Taney bifurcated
his antifederalism; his default position was localist, but he adopted a
nationalist position with respect to slavery (to permit the Court to
protect it).240
The other approach is federalist. An early exemplar was Chief
Justice Marshall, followed by Abraham Lincoln. Federalism, in this
context, presumes that the Constitution's (and the order's) authority
derives from the people not of states but of the nation as a whole.
Typically, this position has entailed a more liberal and/or centralist
conception of norms and institutional relations-one in which the
nation is superior to states in certain domains of action. 241 Against
Taney, Marshall bifurcated his federalism; he was nationalist on most
matters of political economy, but localist with respect to slavery
(permitting states to protect it).242
The differences between the two approaches can range from
profound to subtle. But it is not my purpose here to explore the
analytic details or implications of the approaches. My aim instead is
simply to note that, whichever approach one employs, each invokes
the people as the source for constitutional authority. This is a useful
notion. It comports with widely held conceptions of the ultimate rule
of recognition. It promotes the idea that the people are the proper
beneficiary of governmental action. And it serves as a background
check against governmental excess or folly.

239. On antifederalist constitutionalism in the United States, see BRANDON, supra note 39,
at 42-50, 101-09, 123-27, 192-98.
240. See BRANDON, supra note 39, at 88-100, 111- 15.
241. On federalist constitutionalism in the United States, see BRANDON, supra note 39, at
38-42, 93-94, 189-92.
242. See BRANDON, supra note 39, at 50-55, 93-95.
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The Court, however, has in some contexts called into question
243
the relevance of sovereignty of the people to war and foreign affairs.
A forthright and influential articulation of this position is Justice
Sutherland's opinion of the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.244 The Court held that constitutional constraints on
executive authority were qualitatively different as between "foreign or
external affairs" and "domestic or internal affairs." 245 Thus, Congress
would have been constitutionally prohibited from delegating power to
the President to make criminal law had the context been domestic; but
constitutional limitations do not apply in the same way in the context
of foreign affairs. Why might this be so? Sutherland offered two
foundational rationales.
One was a variation on the story of the creation of American
constitutional order, a variation that combined antifederalist and
federalist tropes, but essentially read the people out of one aspect of
constitutional politics:
[T]he primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve from the general mass of
legislative powers then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable
to vest in the Federal government.... That this doctrine applies only to powers that

243. I should emphasize the phrase "in some contexts." In the context of international
agreements, one question is whether Congress may use them to expand its powers with respect
to matters or in ways that Article I, standing alone, would not authorize. The Court has spoken
with two voices on this question. One decision answers affirmatively. Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920) (upholding congressional regulation of hunting migratory birds, enacted
pursuant to a treaty with Britain, despite earlier judicial holdings that the Tenth Amendment
barred such legislation). Another answers negatively. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1957)
(holding, inter alia, that an executive agreement could not support an extension of military
jurisdiction over dependents of American military personnel stationed outside the United
States). One way of distinguishing these two decisions is to point to the difference between a
treaty and an executive agreement, the former being more authoritative than the latter. Paul J.
Heald and Suzanna Sherry note two alternative bases for distinction. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna
Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute
Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1182 (2000). One basis is that "Holland
might be construed as holding only that the treaty power can supplement Congress's other
powers when they run out, whereas Reid governs when there is a[n express] constitutional limit
on otherwise valid congressional authority." Id. The question here is why the Tenth
Amendment is not an express limit. The other basis, which answers this question, is that
considerations of federalism "do not constrain the treaty power," but "other types of limits on
congressional authority," like the Bill of Rights, do. Id.
244. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
For an adoring account of the content and influence of
Sutherland's approach to executive power in the areas of war and foreign affairs, locating that
approach in a theory of natural right, see HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND:
RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 196-241 (1994). For a less reverential account
of Sutherland's jurisprudence, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 46-

53, 70-83 (2000).
245. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315. Sutherland would later extend the logic of his opinion
in Curtiss-Wrightto a decision holding that mere executive agreements-embodied in diplomatic
correspondence and not subject to ratification by the Senate-were constitutionally binding.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (1937).
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the states had, is self-evident.
And since the states severally never possessed
international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state
24 6
powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other source.

What source?
"The Union," wrote Sutherland, echoing Lincoln,
"existed before the Constitution. '247 Before ratification, "it is clear
that the Union... was the sole possessor of external sovereignty, and
in the Union it remained without change save in so far as the
248
Constitution... qualified its exercise.
The second rationale for distinguishing external from internal
affairs, and buttressing the first, was "the law of nations. ' 249 "As a
member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United
States [in the fields of war and foreign affairs] are equal to the right
and power of the other members of the international family.
Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign. 2 5 °
Consequently, "the investment of the Federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative
grants of the Constitution. '251 If these powers "had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, [they] would have vested in the
'252
Federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.
The problems that Sutherland's statist conception of
sovereignty posed for rights, for the operation of republican
government, or for a constitutionalist allocation of institutional
authority need not have been insurmountable. They were heightened,
however, by four additional aspects of his analysis, each of which
pertains to considerations we have previously considered: executive
exclusivity, secrecy, the blending of military action with foreign
affairs, and the blending of both to matters of domestic concern.
Against Madison, Sutherland anthropomorphized the national
government in the person of the President. The primary effect of this
246. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316. Framed in this way, Sutherland's position is
distinguishable from that of Chief Justice Taney, who had argued that all national powers,
foreign and domestic, derived from the states:
The Constitution was not formed merely to guard the States against danger from
foreign nations, but mainly to secure union and harmony at home.., and to
accomplish this purpose, . . . it was necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty
which the States then possessed should be ceded to the General Government; and
that, in the sphere of action assigned to it, it should be supreme, and strong enough to
execute its own laws by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State or from
State authorities.
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517 (1859).
247. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 317.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 318.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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impersonation was not to rank the authority of competing institutions,
but to focus authority exclusively in the Executive. "The President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation." 25 3 Hence, "we are here dealing [with] ... the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations-a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress
... 254 Let's put aside the fact that this formulation is inconsistent
with a fair reading of the constitutional text, even in the context of
war or foreign affairs. 255 Under Sutherland's theory, not only has the
state become the President, but the President has become sovereign.
The danger of such a concentration is exacerbated by
Sutherland's willingness to tolerate a high level of secrecy in the
conduct of foreign affairs.
[The President], not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be
2 56
highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.

The difficulty here is not that secrecy of some sorts is categorically
impermissible, especially in foreign affairs. But, for reasons discussed
above, 257 because secrecy is problematic, its management requires
sensitivity and special institutional checks against abuse. When
authority is vested exclusively in the Executive, most useful
institutional checks are unavailing.
Still, a constitutionalist might not worry deeply about these
tendencies as long as they are confined to limited aspects of the
conduct of diplomacy with other nations. Sutherland did not so limit
his theory. For one thing, he held that the need for executive control
and secrecy is "especially" acute "in time of war. '258 Again, I do not
claim that secrecy per se is illicit. Some secrecy is necessary for the
successful prosecution of military actions.
Sutherland's theory,

253. Id. at 319.
254. Id. at 319-20. Sutherland's position on this point is distinguishable from the position of
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Trop v. Dulles. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Although Frankfurter agreed with Sutherland that "there is no limitation" on "the
several powers... compendiously described as the 'war power,"' he parted company with
Sutherland on two critical points. Id. at 120. First, with Taney, Frankfurter argued that the
power was delegated by "the States." Id. Second, Frankfurter insisted that the power belonged to
Congress. Id. at 120-21.
255. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
256. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 120-124.
258. Id.
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however, makes the Executive the exclusive repository of information
"especially... in time of war" and perhaps also during any sort
of
military action that can plausibly be linked to national security or the
national interest. 259 Because these events occur so frequently for the
United States, this position undermines institutional checks that not
only are desirable for a healthy constitutional system (if we believe
Madison), but also are established by the Constitution itself.
This is not the only way in which Sutherland's theory of
Presidential power reaches beyond foreign affairs, strictly understood.
For it also extends to domestic matters. Sutherland himself left open
this possibility, notwithstanding his opening embrace of the internalexternal distinction. The President, he held, requires "a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. ' 260 Thus, only when
matters are strictly domestic should executive discretion be
constrained by the Constitution or statute. When domestic affairs
touch matters of international or military concern, however, they
cease to subject presidential power to conventional limits. When
might such a connection be present? Perhaps often, especially given
the incessancy of militarism in American experience and ethos.
Hirabayashiand Korematsu, on one side of the ledger, and Brown v.
Board, on the other, are indications of the ways in which national
security can determine or influence domestic policy. If we search, we
can find other examples.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because my aim here has been to sketch a framework for
understanding
the
relation
between
armed
conflict
and
constitutionalism in the United States, I have focused on general
tendencies, not on fine details. To close, I might offer three sets of
observations that point toward further, perhaps deeper, analysis of
the relationship.
The first concerns the constitutional implications the essay
identifies. It is important to note that these areas of concern are
partially independent of one another. Neither a single armed conflict
nor an aggregation of conflicts will produce uniform effects across
areas. Hence, some conflicts-like those that are either isolated and
discrete or continuous but small-might implicate secrecy, the
allocation of institutional authority, or sovereignty, but have little

259. Id.
260. Id.
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effect on civil liberties. Other conflicts-especially perhaps those that
are large and visible-might fully engage the attention of all relevant
institutions and therefore might have only limited impact on
institutional relations; but some such conflicts could trigger incursions
on civil liberties. Some conflicts-large or small-might awaken
aspects of national ethos that precipitate a decisive demarcation of
interest or identity between "us" and "them." In doing so, such
conflicts can threaten to convert a conflict into a crusade, witch-hunt,
or inquisition. Even within an area of concern-like civil liberties
during and after World War I1-a single conflict can generate
conflicting consequences, some of which strengthen or expand the
scope of liberties, some of which do the opposite.
The second set of observations, related to the first, originates in
a question: What, with respect to armed conflict, is driving these
consequences? In this essay, I have for the most part distinguished
among armed conflicts in a fairly formal way-sorting them by
declared and undeclared wars and significant military actions. One
can push these distinctions further than I have here; but even so, their
utility has limits. More useful, perhaps, for drawing out a subtler,
more complex sense of consequences might be a functional
classification of armed conflict within and across two dimensions. One
concerns the scale of conflict, ranging from massive (like the
Revolution, Civil War, and World War II), to moderate (like the QuasiWar with France, the War of 1812, the Korean War, and the Vietnam
War), to minor (like the two Barbary Wars, the various intercessions
in Latin America, and an array of conflicts spanning the latter half of
26 1
the twentieth century).
The other dimension concerns the character of particular
conflicts. Within this dimension, we might categorize roughly as
follows: (1) conflicts involving perceived danger to the physical safety
of the nation, including but not limited to the sort of critical danger
that might justify the invocation of emergency powers (like the Civil
War, World War II, the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis, and the
current war against terrorism); (2) conflicts in which the nation aims
to promote a general interest in international order (perhaps like
World War I, the intervention in Somalia, and the various actions in
the Balkans); (3) opportunistic conflicts of imperialism (including
campaigns against the Indians, the Mexican War, the Latin-American
campaigns, and the Spanish-American War); (4) conflicts to protect
trade or other parochial interests (like the Barbary Wars, various
261. One would want to specify criteria for inclusion. I have not attempted such a
specification here.
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anti-piracy patrols, slave-trade patrols, and the policing of shipping
lanes in the Persian Gulf); and (5) conflicts arising from failures of
diplomacy or to promote the status of the nation (including several
forays into Latin America and Asia). 262 The relations among these
categories are not ordinal; that is, they are not arranged
hierarchically. Nor are the categories mutually exclusive. Thus, a
particular conflict might arguably fall into more than one category.
But my sense is that a nuanced investigation, that accounts for
considerations of both scale and character, can shed useful light on the
relation between armed conflict and the various constitutional
implications identified in this essay.
Finally, lurking in the essay is a latent story of a larger
tension-not merely between armed conflict and constitutionalism,
but between constitutionalism and the nation-state. As an historical
matter, it is easy enough to appreciate how and why the emergence of
a working theory of constitutionalism was linked to the rise of the
nation-state. More difficult is comprehending how and why the two
might be at odds. The issue of tension, if not incompatibility, is larger
than the location (or even the relevance) of sovereignty. It also has to
do with the fact that constitutionalism presupposes certain norms or
values logically antecedent to the state. These norms need not be
universalist or naturalist. Nor do they necessarily entail
internationalism. They are simply norms that pertain to a political
order if it is to be constitutionalist.
We may well be entering a time, however, in which this sort of
constitutionalism-linked as it is to individual nation-states-is a
quaint relic of a simpler time. If so, many of the factors driving this
condition are certainly external to any individual state. 263 But, as this
essay has suggested, some are internal as well. In previous work, I
offered a four-fold typology of constitutional failure: failures of
constitutional discourse, of constitutional order, of a constitution, and
of constitutionalism. 264 Of these, the fourth-the "failure to employ
basic principles of constitutionalism within a regime or in moving into
or out of such a regime"-is the most easily tolerated, because it is the
most difficult to detect and the easiest to rationalize away in the
interest of (perceived) necessity. 265 But once it occurs, a failure of
constitutionalism can be the most difficult type of failure to overcome,
because its implications are so subtle and far-reaching and because
262. I am grateful to Robert Covington for helping me clarify these categories.
263. For an ambitious analysis of these external circumstances, see generally PHILIP
BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002).

264. BRANDON, supranote 39, at 18-22.
265. Id. at 18.
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correction frequently requires such a fundamental alteration of norms,
institutions, and practices.
The antifederalist John DeWitt claimed that the proposed
Constitution of the United States was "nothing less than a hasty
stride to Universal Empire in this Western World." 266 He was wrong,
of course. The Constitution was not a hasty step. Nor need it (nor the
government it authorized) have been imperial in the sense DeWitt
intended. 26 7 But as Felix Frankfurter noted in the Steel Seizure Case,
"The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does
come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked
disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested
268
assertion of authority."
I am suspicious of apocalyptic visions and prophetic predictions
of doom. Still, I sense reasons for disquiet over the health of
constitutionalism in the United States. My focus here has been only
on one aspect of the American order: the history and practice of
militarism.
The ethos that has ignored it, the institutional
spinelessness that has permitted it, and the judicial doctrines that
have justified it threaten to enfeeble constitutionalism in America.
Pace Mansfield and Winthrop, 269 this is the dominant theme of the
American century.

266. John DeWitt, Essay III, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION DEBATES 313, 313 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986).
267. But see THE FEDERALIST Nos.

1, 6, 13, 22, 23, 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (invoking

empire" as both a description of and an aspiration for American constitutional order). See also
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (where Chief Justice Marshall describes "the
American union" as "a large empire").
268. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
269. See supra note 1.
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Appendix:
270
Significant Military Conflicts of the United States

1775-1783: Revolutionary War
1775-1783: campaigns against the British (d)
1775-1783: dispersal of pro-British Iroquois (ic)
1791: Miami (under Little Turtle) defeat Gen. Arthur St. Clair (ic)
1794: U.S. defeats Miami, Shawnee, et al., in Battle of Fallen Timbers
(ic)
1794: Militias suppress Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania
1798-1801: Quasi-War with France (u)
1801-1805: First Barbary War (u)
1806-1810: anti-piracy patrols in Gulf of Mexico
1810-1814: seizure of Spanish territories in West Florida
1811: Gen. William Henry Harrison defeats northwestern tribes at
Tippecanoe (ic)
1812-1815: War of 1812 (d)
1814: Gen. Andrew Jackson defeats Creeks at Horseshoe Bend (ic)
1814-1830s: anti-piracy patrols and raids in the Caribbean
1815: Second Barbary War (u)
1816-1818: First Seminole War (ic)
1818: USS Ontario seizes control of Oregon Territory
1820-1861: African slave-trade patrols
1832: Black Hawk War to expel the Sauk and Fox from Illinois (ic)
1835-1842: campaigns (including Second Seminole War) against
southeastern tribes (ic)
1846-1848: Mexican War (d)
1847: Pueblo revolt suppressed (ic)
270. See generally MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN POWER (2002); DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY (James Truslow Adams ed., rev. ed.
1976); DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY SUPPLEMENT (Robert H. Ferrell & Joan Hoff eds.,
1996); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONFLICTS SINCE WORLD WAR II (James Ciment ed., 1999);
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE INTERWAR YEARS: FROM 1919 TO 1939 (Mark Grossman ed., 2000); FAMILY
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1975); FISHER, supra note 96; INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT:
A CHRONOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONFLICTS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT, 1945-1995 (Jacob
Bercovitch ed., 1997); READER'S GUIDE TO AMERICAN HISTORY (Peter J. Parish ed., 1997);
READER'S GUIDE TO MILITARY HISTORY (Charles Messenger ed., 2001); A STUDY OF CRISIS

(Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfel eds., 1997); Kaplan, supra note 11; Eric Schmitt, U.S.
Combat Force of 1,700 Is Headed to the Philippines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL
13612976; Collier, supra note 8; Naval Historical Ctr., Wars and Conflicts of the United States
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1853-1854: Commodore Perry's Demonstrations and Invasions to
"open" Japan
1854: bombardment and burning of Greytown, Nicaragua
1861-1865: Civil War (u)
1861-1865: 'Pacification' of the Navajo (ic)
1863-1864: retaliation, demonstration, and compulsion against Japan
1872: defeat of the Modoc in Oregon (ic)
1876: Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse defeat Custer at Little Big Horn
(ic)
1877: Nez Perce (under Chief Joseph) defeated (ic)
1890: end of armed Indian hostilities at Wounded Knee (ic)
1898: Spanish-American War (d)
1899-1902: Philippine Insurrection Campaign
1900-1901: China Relief Expedition, after outbreak of Boxer Rebellion
1902-1934: Latin-American Campaigns
1902: U.S. forces prevent Colombia from putting down an
insurrection (instigated by U.S.) in Isthmus of Panama
1903-1914: occupation of Isthmus of Panama after Colombia
refuses to ratify treaty granting U.S. a right of way in Panama
1906-1909: Cuban Pacification
1909: USMC deployed to destabilize presidency of Jose Santos
Zelaya
1912-1925: I st Nicaraguan Campaign
1914: seizure and bombardment of Veracruz
1914-1917: Mexican Border Campaign after Dolphin affair and
Pancho Villa's raids
1915-1934: Haitian Campaign
1916-1924: USMC occupation of Dominican Republic
1917-1922: occupation of Cuba
1918-1919: Series of skirmishes with Mexican bandits and troops
1918-1920: U.S. troops police Panama
1926-1933: 2nd Nicaraguan Campaign
1912-1941: demonstrations, patrols, and landing parties in China,
after Japanese invasion (including intensified landings and
bombardments, in response to factional hostilities, 1922-1927)
1917-1918: World War I (d)
1918-1922: occupation of Vladivostok, Soviet Russia, after Bolshevik
Revolution
1918-1920: Allied occupation
1920-1922: USMC occupation to protect US property
1941-1945: World War II (d)
1945-1949: troops occupy parts of China to support Nationalists
against Japanese, then against Communists
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1948-1949: Berlin airlift
1950-present: Korean Conflict
1950-1953: Korean War (u)
1953-present: U.S. forces police DMZ
1950-1955: U.S. Seventh Fleet protects Formosa from attack by
Communists
1958: USMC deployed to Lebanon
1961: invasion of Cuba at Bay of Pigs
1962: Cuban Missile Crisis
1962-1975: Vietnam War and aftermath
1962-1973: military operations in Vietnam (u)
1962-1975: support for government of Laos
1970: incursion into Cambodia
1975: evacuation from Vietnam and Cambodia
1975: U.S. forces retake USS Mayaguez
1965: intervention in Dominican Republic's civil war
1967: intervention to support government of Congo against a revolt
1982: participation in Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai
1982: participation in Multinational Force in Lebanon
1983: invasion of Grenada
1983-1989: exercises to support Honduras against Nicaragua
1986: air strikes against Libya
1987-1988: Naval forces protect shipping lanes in Persian Gulf after
Iran-Iraq War
1988-1989: invasion of Panama and seizure of General Noriega
(Operation Just Cause)
1989-present: military personnel support "war on drugs" in Andean
nations
1990-present: Persian Gulf War against Iraq
1990-1991: military operations (Operations Desert Shield / Desert
Storm) (u)
1992-present: post-War policing of Iraq
1992-1993: intervention in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope)
1992-1995: multinational interventions in the Balkans (Operations
Sharp Guard / Deny Flight / Deliberate Force) (u)
1993: missile attack on Baghdad, Iraq
1993-1994: intervention in Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy)
1999: bombing of Kosovo and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Operation Allied Force)
2001-present: war against terrorism
2001-present: invasion of Afghanistan (Operation Infinite Justice)
(u)
2003-present: USMC deployment to Philippines
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2002-present: mobilization for and invasion of Iraq (Operation Iraqi
Freedom) (u)
(d) = declared war
(ic) = Indian campaign
(u) = undeclared war

